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INTRABLOC

GDR Defense Minister Kessler Discusses Arms Cuts

AU3009215188 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
30 Sep 88 pp 4-8

[Interview with General Heinz Kessler, minister for national defense, by DIE ZEIT chief editor Theo Sommer and DIE ZEIT GDR correspondent Marlies Menge in East Berlin's Karolinenhof "last week": "Let Us Put Our Cards on the Table and Begin!"]

[Text] [ZEIT] Mr Minister, you published a lengthy article on the GDR's security-policy concepts in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 6 weeks ago. One paragraph was interpreted in the FRG as an invitation to the new defense minister, Professor Scholz, to open direct talks. But, according to the exact wording, you suggested talks "between the defense ministries and military experts of other NATO and Warsaw Pact states, including the GDR and FRG." Does a personal invitation or a personal request for talks exist?

[Kessler] No, not so far.

[ZEIT] Does that mean you are not interested in talks with the FRG defense minister?

[Kessler] On the contrary, I am very much interested.

[ZEIT] Minister Scholz said that talks of this kind must not only be conducted for show, but that they should also yield results. What results do you think could be achieved?

[Kessler] When I wrote this, I started from the assumption that in the current situation, after a number of encouraging signs for all aspects of disarmament have emerged, it would be useful if people from our spheres—I am thinking of the defense ministries in whatever country—could meet, with or without an agenda, to get to know each other, to expound their ideas, exchange them, or to argue, if this is necessary, in a businesslike and reasonable manner. When I wrote this, of course, I also understood it—and I am glad that it was interpreted in this way—as an encouragement both for me and for the FRG defense minister.

One can hardly predict whether something will come of this. In any case, every side will get an idea of the other side. By getting to know each other, by talking about all kinds of things, also about personal matters, possibilities will open up to discuss concrete aspects that can have a bilateral or multilateral character.

I was also encouraged by the fact that there is hardly any sphere between responsible figures from the FRG and GDR in which people do not meet. I asked myself: Why

should we not do that? Nobody—least of all myself—has the intention of making the FRG defense minister a communist, and I hope he does not have the opposite intention.

[ZEIT] What do you want to discuss with Mr Scholz?

[Kessler] The military doctrines of both sides could be discussed in light of the readiness declared by both sides that war shall never again emanate from German soil. It is also conceivable to conduct an exchange of views on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, in central Europe in particular. I would like to explain our proposals to create a chemical-weapons-free zone, a nuclear-free corridor, and a zone of confidence and security in central Europe.

[ZEIT] There is a specific problem that concerns only the two German states: the situation at the border. Mr Scholz will certainly address this topic. In no way can the question concerning the guidelines for the use of firearms at the border be omitted. Would you try to avoid discussing this issue?

[Kessler] No, certainly not.

[ZEIT] I am speaking about the order to shoot which exists on your side. The form in which it exists and the way it is being practiced constitutes at the least a continued psychological strain on our relations. What can you say about this order? Is it correct that it has been changed or has recently been practiced in a different manner, or that it is to be abolished altogether?

[Kessler] First of all, let me say a few words about the border.

[ZEIT] Which is not questioned by us.

[Kessler] We do not now want to define who "us" is.

[ZEIT] In the Basic Treaty, the FRG Government has undertaken to respect the territorial integrity of the partner to the treaty.

[Kessler] Let me make the following basic statement on the border: I share the view of Willy Brandt, who recently said that the 13 August was a day of relief for the governments of the three Western powers, because their rights were not infringed upon and the danger of war was averted. This was the main reason why we thought that this had to be done. But there was also another reason: Under the conditions of the open border we paid an enormous price. We paid with good material. People who have examined these matters—not only in our country but also at institutes in other countries—have put the price at DM100 million; I think that this is not sufficient. Numerous people were pulled away, enticed away, whatever you want to call it.

[ZEIT] But many people were also attracted.

[Kessler] Maybe, yes. But it is also important by what and what for. These were the facts for us, and in addition to that, a very serious military-political situation had emerged for us. I do not want to recall what tones were heard from the other side at the time. As a result, the corresponding border situations were created.

[ZEIT] The idea that NATO planned an attack on the GDR at the time—which has always been your official version—is simply not correct.

[Kessler] Let me say a few words on the character of the border: At the beginning, this border—both with the FRG and West Berlin—was very simple and without problems in terms of technical and organizational aspects; it was a border like everywhere else in the world. It was only after some time, after we had had certain experiences, that we constructed it in such a way that it cannot be breached, except with the aid of heavy arms, or in such a way that it represents a risk for everybody who tries to breach it.

[ZEIT] However, no shots are fired at people who try to breach it from the West!

[Kessler] I will speak about shots later, I do not want to evade this issue—there is no reason to evade it.

We have always stated that the character of this border—like that of every other border in the world—will correspond to the development of the conditions which allow the creation of different prerequisites. In the course of the development, particularly that of the changing relations between the two German states—in which both sides have a positive share—the situation has changed, and we have basically absolutely abolished many regulations and security measures which we used to apply both toward West Berlin and the FRG. An order to shoot has never—never!—existed. Believe me, it does not exist now in the form that has been claimed and is still being claimed by certain sides.

[ZEIT] In what form did it exist and does it still exist?

[Kessler] Let me tell you this: Firing shots was only allowed in cases of forcibly transgressing the border from both sides and in cases of attacks on persons who are protecting the border on the order of the GDR.

[ZEIT] Why don't you publish the regulation you are quoting?

[Kessler] It has been published.

[ZEIT] But so far it has not been accessible to the public.

[Kessler] It has been published, but nobody takes note of it.

[ZEIT] This topic cannot be avoided by the two German defense ministers.

[Kessler] Of course not.

[ZEIT] But this should not be an obstacle to talks on other issues that are of far-reaching importance for the two German states and for the two halves of Europe. One question arises in this context: Both the FRG and GDR are incorporated in their respective pact systems. They cannot act on their own initiative in the disarmament sphere. What leeway does the GDR have within the organization of the Warsaw Pact? Where do you see the leeway for Bonn within NATO?

[Kessler] We are realists. We know that it would be futile to want to remove the FRG from NATO or to ban the United States from Western Europe. And we do not want to suggest to the FRG to act "on its own initiative" or to create mistrust among the alliance partners. What is important today is the safeguarding of peace. Since—like in all other states—the further shaping of the socialist society in the GDR requires peaceful conditions, the GDR is always in a position to take many and varied initiatives in the field of safeguarding peace. We have repeatedly demonstrated this. The GDR's incorporation in the Warsaw Pact does not limit our initiatives for disarmament steps, but puts them on a broad basis. From the Western side, however, we have repeatedly been confronted with the assertion that the FRG's incorporation into the Western alliance limits its room to maneuver. Honestly, I do not see why a state like the FRG, that has considerable economic, scientific-technological, political, and of course military weight within NATO, should have no leeway for initiatives of its own that serve the aim that war shall never again start from German soil.

[ZEIT] Is there a common German interest in disarmament that differs from the needs of the respective alliance partners?

[Kessler] Obviously, the advantage is that the two people in both German states in particular would gain from further steps toward arms limitation and disarmament. They would be the first victims and those who would suffer most in any military conflict, no matter how it comes about. This is why we believe that it is particularly the two German states that can and must do more than any other state to gradually reduce the danger of military conflicts on the dividing line between the two alliances and to enhance the awareness of joint security interests.

Especially here, on the sensitive dividing line between socialism and capitalism, where the strongest and most modern armed forces of our times are facing each other, where there is the world's greatest concentration of troops and arms in a densely populated and highly industrialized conurbation area, is it of the greatest importance to create confidence between the states with different social systems, to open up possibilities for the peaceful settlement of incidents, and to agree jointly on

specific disarmament steps. This would tangibly reduce military confrontation on our continent. We believe that in this way all peoples and states in Europe would gain more security.

[ZEIT] There is no doubt about that.

[Kessler] The elastic, mobile, and flexible attitude of the GDR, for example, has contributed considerably to bringing about the INF Treaty. This basically demonstrates that the two German states, on the basis of their common interests in this sphere, can indeed achieve something jointly in their respective spheres of activity—the two alliances.

I do not want to be misunderstood. We have assumed our obligations within the Warsaw Pact, and the FRG its obligations within NATO. There is no doubt about that. The most recent months and years, however, have demonstrated that we can achieve quite a lot concerning the atmosphere and on specific issues.

[ZEIT] On what threat analysis have you based your military planning? How do you assess the balance of power in Europe today?

[Kessler] We soberly start from the possibilities that the NATO states and your armed forces have, what they will mobilize and deploy in a war against socialism, and what strikes they could launch against our armed forces and against the political and the political-economic centers of our countries. The analysis of NATO troop and staff maneuvers shows that NATO's armed forces are equipped with modern arms and are constantly kept at a high degree of continued combat readiness and could thus be deployed along our border within a few hours and could launch attacks into our territory, particularly with their aircraft and missile forces.

There is no need for me to explain to you that more people live in the NATO states, that a larger industrial and scientific-technological potential is available than in the Warsaw Pact countries. In spite of this, we believe that there is an overall approximate military-strategic balance in Europe, with disparities in individual regions and concerning individual types of weapons. This also holds true for central Europe, where the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries would probably be in a position to deploy more tanks, and where the NATO armies could deploy more bomber aircraft and fighter bombers.

As a matter of fact, some Western publications speak of an overwhelming conventional superiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact. However, there are also sober analyses. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are characterized by a complex composition. Their structures and equipment differ greatly. As a result, only a comprehensive approach can produce an objective picture.

For this reason it is important to analyze the real possibilities on both sides and not to single out individual types of weapons. Therefore, the Warsaw Pact states have suggested to NATO a joint official exchange of data which would be coupled with verification and on-site inspections concerning the jointly published figures, in order to be able to objectively assess the current balance of power.

[ZEIT] The exchange of data, the disclosure of the strength of the arsenals turned out to be the stumbling block for the Vienna MBFR talks, which have been carried on for 15 years. NATO says: We have repeatedly submitted official comparisons of the armed forces, but we have seen no official document from the East. Please excuse the term "East."

[Kessler] That is okay.

[ZEIT] The West is particularly deploring the fact that the criteria for counting have never been divulged. In this context, the following question arises: How many of your artillery barrels can be used as dual-capable systems, both nuclear and conventional ones? Or another extraordinarily significant question: How many fighter aircraft can also be used as combat aircraft? NATO claims that your calculation, according to which the West has a sizable superiority in air forces, can only be explained by the fact that you exclude some 1,700 aircraft of your fighter defense unit from the calculation, whereas NATO claims that all these aircraft can also be converted into attack bombers. How can such discrepancies be dealt with at the negotiating table?

[Kessler] We do not want to start counting now because we will never finish. I want to speak about the principle.

I believe that we all—by "we" I mean both sides—go through a learning process in the course of negotiations. All sides are convinced that problems cannot be solved through general assurances. One of the problems that is not to be underestimated is contained in the question: What does the one side have and what does the other have?

[ZEIT] If one wants a reduction by percentage points, one must know what 100 percent is.

[Kessler] This is correct. Fifteen years ago, however, the two sides did not think in this way. A process was necessary.

[ZEIT] On both sides.

[Kessler] Just think how long—which is understandable—deliberations, discussions, and negotiations on the INF Treaty have taken! The question of what is to be included and what is to be excluded played no minor role, and compromises were made by both sides.

However, let us go back to so-called conventional weapons. If one really wants disarmament, one must have a basis for this. The basis can only consist of all sides putting their cards on the table. The next step is the assessment of the cards, but first the cards must be put on the table. We are in favor of this.

However, the cards are of no use if they are on the table but nobody can prove that the cards are correct. The disclosure by every side of what it has must therefore be coupled with the possibility of carrying out on-site inspections. This is possible today—as demonstrated by the INF Treaty, by the testing of methods to measure U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests. This is not merely day-dreaming or indulging in reveries. This is a plausible proposal that does not harm or favor anybody. This is why we support it with such vigor.

[ZEIT] Are narrow nuclear-free zones, as you suggested, still of importance now that disarmament in a much broader strip—from the Atlantic to the Urals—is under discussion? What is important today is the broad-scale elimination of imbalances!

[Kessler] The term “narrow” is, of course, relative. As a matter of fact, Erich Honecker has expressed the GDR's readiness to include its entire territory in such a zone, and Karoly Grosz, during his visit to Berlin, has announced the same for Hungary.

If the creation of nuclear-free zones was of so little importance, it should be all the easier for NATO to support corresponding initiatives. Its 30-year-old stubborn opposition to the proposals, however, shows that these corridor initiatives probably interfere with certain nuclear forward strategies and first-strike doctrines of the NATO staffs.

As a matter of fact, we are in favor of not only creating a corridor between nuclear weapons in central Europe, but of eventually scrapping and eliminating all nuclear arms in Europe. The Warsaw Pact states are ready to proceed from zero option to zero option.

[ZEIT] Why, in your view, should the mere moving apart of nuclear arsenals increase stability?

[Kessler] Through the creation of a nuclear-free corridor or even larger zone in Europe, the direct nuclear confrontation along the dividing line between between the Warsaw Pact and NATO would be reduced. Longer early warning times would be the result. The possibility of surprise attacks as well as security risks through technical or human error would decrease. The shaping of our European home in the spirit of good-neighborliness would be promoted, and the path toward further disarmament steps would become broader.

Even a “simple moving apart” of nuclear weapons would not be useless because this region shows the densest concentration of weapons of mass destruction on the

whole globe, weapons which are partly deployed close to the border. Every military conflict that exceeds the limits of a border incident could trigger a nuclear inferno.

However, all experience has confirmed that disarmament can only be achieved step by step. We are not advocates of the “all or nothing” concept, even less so in this vital sphere. Nuclear-free zones represent such a step.

[ZEIT] Why insist on the concept of strips if we finally have the chance to thin out nuclear weapons on the entire continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals?

[Kessler] This is no contradiction! Experience has taught us one thing: If we all want to achieve a consensus on the basis of the “all or nothing” principle, we should abandon the whole idea. If everybody is serious, gradual progress is possible. It is good if somebody says today: “We will include the whole of Europe.” Then we will forget about the concept of corridors. This is only one element! Nuclear-free strips—nobody claims that this is the solution to all problems. But it would be a step, however modest it may be. How can anybody be opposed to it?

[ZEIT] Things like that should not be done outside the large scale agreements, but within their framework.

[Kessler] If this is possible.

[ZEIT] If the creation of thinned out nuclear strips could be the first or second step in a foreseeable number of steps, this would not be an advance step that could remain isolated and not followed by other steps.

[Kessler] This is also a way. I have no objection to such a possibility.

[ZEIT] Negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Western Europe will soon be placed in the foreground. It will mainly be a question of eliminating existing disparities, particularly concerning the decisive, major equipment of the ground troops: tanks and artillery. The Warsaw Pact has a clear superiority in these categories. Are you ready to accept the same ceilings and reduce your weapons to this level? Would you also be willing to reduce arsenals by 50 percent within these ceilings, as suggested by CDU Bundestag Deputy Ruehe? And are you familiar with the idea that the allied stationed forces—primarily their combat units that have major pieces of equipment which are capable of attack—should be only half as strong as your own troops?

[Kessler] The Warsaw Pact states have recently explained how they want to achieve the desired goal, which is to radically reduce the military potentials of both alliances and to bring about a situation on the

continent in which the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries keep the forces and means that are needed for their defense, but which are not sufficient for surprise attacks and attack operations.

Our joint proposal is aimed at reducing the level of armed forces and weapons by eliminating imbalances and asymmetries on both sides during an initial phase. This should be done in accordance with the principle that those who have a lead must carry out greater reductions.

It is important that this be done by both sides, and in a balanced manner. In this way imbalances concerning tanks and attack aircraft can be eliminated. The Warsaw Pact states are ready to put this into practice. In this way it would become possible to achieve the same or balanced collective ceilings for the strength of the armed forces and conventional weapons. These ceilings would be lower than the current level on every side.

During the second and third phases, another drastic reduction in armed forces and weapons would take place.

Mr Ruehe's statements contain interesting ideas. It will become clear whether NATO is ready to present them in Vienna at the negotiating table. We are open to all proposals that are based on the principle of equality and equal security. However, we still hear too many voices that reject substantive disarmament steps on the part of NATO and want to push us toward unilateral advance concessions, but which do not even mention unilateral actions that have already been carried out by the Warsaw Pact states.

[ZEIT] You have repeatedly stressed your interest in the reduction and withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany. In this connection, you are primarily looking toward the FRG. What about your efforts to reduce the 380,000 Soviet soldiers in the GDR?

[Kessler] I would like to set this right first: Never and nowhere have I stated that I put an emphasis on the reduction of foreign troops, and I have not said at all that U.S. troops have to be withdrawn and that everything else in the world would remain as it is. I do not have such a naive perception of the things and I cannot have because it is unrealistic.

[ZEIT] In the meantime, the Soviet Union has started to think about revising the current military doctrine—away from offensive defense, which the West considers a threat, and toward a purely defensive defense, which is not linked with any attack capability. What are the GDR's intellectual contributions to this?

[Kessler] First, one has to correctly note that the Soviet Union not only thinks about that, but that the process of working out and implementing the new military doctrine has already made much progress and that this strictly defensive doctrine is permeating the entire practical work of the troops.

We are in favor of experts of the Warsaw Pact and NATO meeting as soon as possible and of each side explaining the contents and the orientation of its military doctrine. Here the concepts could be compared and they could try to reach a common view about the direction of their further development.

The NATO countries characterize their military doctrine—the strategy of “flexible response”—as a purely defensive doctrine. However, we see the NATO forces that are deployed on the other side of our border with their offensively oriented concepts of “deep attacks” [tiefe Schläge], of the “air-land battle,” and of the attack against the following echelon and the reserves of the Warsaw Pact. In view of our geographic location, the NATO autumn maneuver series is causing particular concern among our people. During the “Autumn Forge” maneuvers, several corps and divisions carried out large scale maneuvers on FRG territory, in the immediate proximity of our border—maneuvers from which it would be possible to proceed, without long preparations, to real military actions, which would carry the added weight of surprise.

We are also not indifferent to the fact that NATO adheres to the concepts of deterrence, including the first use of nuclear weapons. Influential circles are striving “to compensate” for disarmament measures that have been initiated, by, among other things, a follow-up system for the “Lance” missiles, which is to have a range of close to the 500-km limit.

[ZEIT] Both sides have mirror image fears. Until the disarmament dialogue has led to solid results, both sides will naturally continue with armament and modernization. In every army there is constant modernization, from non-perishable sausages to tanks; this is no proof of ill will.

[Kessler] I do not get this at all. This is too general, too sweeping, and too philosophical for me.

[ZEIT] You are also modernizing your missile arsenal; in our country it is to be minimized at the same time, that is, the number of missiles is to be cut back greatly.

[Kessler] I do not deny that we are also modernizing here and there, but that does not seem to be the point. The point is that a treaty, which has been concluded, now has to be implemented step by step—and not only on paper—and that at the same time it is seriously considered to compensate for the reduction. If the “Lance” missiles are modernized in such a way that they fly for 497 or 498 km, which is only 2 or 3 km less than the

decided lower limit of the intermediate-range missiles that have to be destroyed, this is not honest and not okay, to put it in informal terms.

[ZEIT] Our people will show you the calculations about what kind of developments are taking place on your missile sites.

[Kessler] I admit that, but I am in favor of calculations. I want us both to put our calculations on the table, all of them, so that everyone has the opportunity to check them. I expect very much of that.

[ZEIT] In your country and in Soviet military literature one can read much on the issue of military doctrine, but where is the proof of the change in your military doctrine? To date your doctrine has been based on offensive defense, defense by means of attack, and your officers were taught that only an attack can bring about the decision. To date, neither the military lexicon of the GDR, nor the Soviet military encyclopedia, nor the arrangement of your large scale maneuvers, nor the deployment of your troops show that there has already been some change in the Soviet military doctrine. Our experts do not see any change.

[Kessler] The main thesis of the military doctrine, which was adopted here in Berlin, says that the Warsaw Pact states will never be the first to start a war with nuclear or conventional weapons if their state borders are not directly attacked. This is the core of the doctrine.

[ZEIT] Was this different before?

[Kessler] You are not quite so ignorant in this field, Mr Sommer!

We also said: We thus declare that we renounce any preventive actions and escalating measures in a situation of imminent danger of war. One who does not deal with military-political questions but with military issues has to ask here how great the risk is that we incur by doing this. However, this is also the difference you asked about: There has been no change in our principle—the principle of “We never will.” Rather, the declaration of the Warsaw Pact states’ doctrine has changed our possibility of rejecting an aggression by the enemy at the earliest possible time. Formerly one could say: There are certain indications that something is going on that is directed against the border—and then one could take precautions. We have departed from this path. We say: We can start to act militarily only if the border is attacked or is violated by military means.

[ZEIT] With this you are assuming exactly NATO’s standpoint.

[Kessler] No.

[ZEIT] It has always been NATO’s assignment to prevent violations of borders or to reestablish the integrity of the violated area in case of an attack.

[Kessler] Then they should state that they renounce flexible response and the nuclear first strike!

[ZEIT] You brought the word response actions into the discussion. The entire flexible response is a response action.

[Kessler] No.

[ZEIT] A response to the previous attack which you deny ever having intended. When we now hear again that in 1961 NATO was on the point of attacking the GDR, you would actually have been permitted—in accordance with your old doctrine—to engage in a preventive war at that time. Now you say: Today we would no longer do this; we renounce this. However, the possibility of such an erroneous assessment cannot be excluded. Now our military men say: “We will not believe in this change until we see that the troops are deployed differently and that the army regulations and the tactical command principles are phrased differently.”

[Kessler] They have been and still are being phrased differently.

[ZEIT] Our maneuver observers say that this cannot yet be seen in the arrangement of the large scale maneuvers.

[Kessler] Yes, it can, and most maneuver observers confirm this.

[ZEIT] There are even some observers who report: When we arrive the exercises of defensive attacks are interrupted. Can you understand the skepticism of your colleagues from the other side?

[Kessler] Yes, but I would like to say in our favor that we are willing to prove this. Why is it not possible, for instance, that Mr Scholz and I talk about this? Why can we not say in the end: “Okay, you put your documents on the table and we will put ours on the table and then you show us the contents of your operative and tactical training and we will show you our training?” This would be a useful purpose of the talks.

[ZEIT] Your offer for talks, which at first was formulated rather vaguely, has not been rejected at all.

[Kessler] I did not say this. I even said that I thought I had to take some initiative in this direction because among other things, I feel that there is, after all, a certain readiness for talks.

[ZEIT] The question is, why are you urging and grumbling so much? In Vienna the talks on the mandate for negotiations have not yet been concluded. The conclusion is hindered, above all, by one of your fraternal

socialist countries—Romania. But the Western alliance proceeds from the premise that it will be possible to start negotiations by the end of this year. Until then, the West will have concluded the certainly not simple process of bringing the different opinions within the alliance to a common denominator.

[Kessler] I share the optimism with regard to Vienna and the adoption of the mandate. The GDR, for its part, with its moderate possibilities, is doing everything to make this optimism reality. I know from my own experience that in any alliance it is not quite so easy to struggle toward a joint opinion, to put these things on the table, to have them checked, and so on. I am not making things simple for myself by saying that the NATO states only have to sit down and they will find the answer immediately. But, please, then one side also has to stop trying to sabotage the other.

[ZEIT] What for instance?

[Kessler] It is said, for instance, that we have overwhelming superiority in the conventional field—too many tanks, too much artillery. Of course, we are superior in certain fields. But we say—and we think that we can also prove it—that the other side, too, is superior in certain areas concerning geographic location and the kinds of weapons.

Progress would be made most swiftly if we were to say: We simultaneously publish our figures, but we present the figures to each other before that, prove to each other the discrepancies of both sides, check things again, and then put them on the table at the same time—in my view this has to be linked with the possibility of checking on the issues according to a fixed procedure.

[ZEIT] Does this also apply to planes?

[Kessler] NATO claims that we do not count planes that are used for certain purposes in the respective category. Okay, go and look. Then one will see whether the figures that we have jointly published need to be corrected. But rest assured that this would be the case on both sides.

[ZEIT] Some of your explanations cause surprise with the insinuation that war is in the air. We do not think that you want to attack today or tomorrow, or the day after, and it is not to be assumed that you think that we intend to attack. The danger that a war might break out or might be precipitated by one side is certainly not topical.

[Kessler] Over the past months or the past 2, 3 years no one has claimed that there is an imminent danger of war in our area—I do not speak of Iran and Iraq. I have not claimed that, either.

Recently, State Council Chairman Honecker spoke about the problem of disarmament and the safeguarding of peace. He proceeded from the correct assertion that,

thanks to the efforts of all parties involved, one can now speak of a reduction of the dangers compared with the past. Yes, he said that the trend to push back such dangers is predominant now. But one must not overlook the fact that there are still numerous hotbeds of crisis and possibilities for conflicts, which could lead—very quickly, indeed—to the danger of an explosion.

[ZEIT] The GDR obviously has difficulties in eliminating the old enemy images. "Imperialism" is still considered rapacious, aggressive, and expansionist, and the Bundeswehr soldier is considered the "enemy." The members of the National People's Army—but also those of the Young Pioneers and the school children—are trained to hate the West. How does this tally with the new thinking that is starting to gain ground elsewhere? Or with the statement in the joint SED - SPD paper, according to which both sides must consider each other capable of peace?

[Kessler] Mr Sommer, you certainly know the political scenery in the FRG, the United States, and other NATO states better than I do, and, therefore, you know how broad the range of goals, actions, and especially the methods of influence on the socialist countries and the young national states is. There are not a few and not unimportant forces and political groups that would like to "put an end" to socialism following the "Grenada" method—today in Cuba, tomorrow in the GDR, the day after tomorrow in Poland, if it were so simple as in Grenada and if the relationships of power were so favorable.

You know our views on imperialism as a social system and its inherent regular trends toward expansion and aggression, and we have not had any convincing reasons to throw overboard this assessment by Lenin and other Marxist theorists, which has been proven by history and the present.

But there is something else that is new and gaining increasing weight and importance, namely the fact that in the capitalist world the circle of realistically-minded politicians, business representatives, cultural workers, and also military men is—slowly but surely—increasing, and that these people have views which are different from those of the so-called "hawks" about the security interests of their countries and the capitalist world as a whole.

Above all, more and more politicians—also in the governments of the United States and of other NATO countries—realize that a war between the two military coalitions cannot be won by either side but could very well destroy human civilization, and that this therefore must be prevented. The stronger these forces become, the more the "capability for peace" of the capitalist states increases.

We do not in any way keep these assessments and processes in the capitalist camp secret from our Army soldiers. Furthermore, it is simply untrue that we consider every Bundeswehr soldier an enemy and that schoolchildren are trained "to hate the West." In addition, the West is not the term that we use to define sociopolitical structures—we also do not use "the East," "the North," or the "South."

Apart from this, we know very well that in the capitalist states millions of workers and peasants, intellectual and cultural workers, and hundreds of thousands of socialists, social democrats, and communists are advocating peace and progress. Why should we hate them, our comrades-in-class and supporters of the same cause?

We consider our enemies to be those who attack our state and social system, the life and freedom of our citizens, or who directly and consciously prepare this attack—for instance, through instigation and defamation of other countries and states, or through arousing hatred for other races and peoples.

[ZEIT] But the enemy has to be somewhere, it has to be tangible, and also for the young people whom you want to join the Army.

[Kessler] Of course, in the course of the development, which is heading in the direction of detente—and I hope this remains so—it is more complicated to explain to young people the need to do their duty here, in this socialist army. Nobody denies this; those who deny it do not see the world as it is.

[ZEIT] Is it more difficult to motivate the people for military service because of detente, perestroyka, and glasnost?

[Kessler] Not because of perestroyka and glasnost—because of detente.

[ZEIT] Like in our country.

[Kessler] I know how many people refuse to serve in the Army in your country.

[ZEIT] Is the percentage similarly high in the GDR?

[Kessler] No.

[ZEIT] Would it be similar if one were permitted to refuse military service without any consequences?

[Kessler] I will give you figures: We have a draft twice a year, and we have about 500 to 600 construction soldiers [bausoldat] each time.

[ZEIT] The GDR does not have a regulation for alternative service apart from the construction soldiers. This is deplored by the churches, for instance. Will you soon introduce a true alternative service?

[Kessler] According to the GDR Constitution, every citizen is obligated to do service and do something for the defense of the GDR, in line with the law. In accordance with a 1964 decree of the National Defense Council on the establishment of construction units, many years ago we introduced work in these units as a service that corresponds to military service. Until 1982 we called it alternative service, in line with the regulations of the 1962 Compulsory Military Service Law.

This method has proved its worth, as has also been repeatedly confirmed by church circles. Therefore, it is incorrect, for instance, to say that "the churches" in our country deplore this situation. The number of construction units is sufficient so that future theology students, for example, or other citizens with strong religious motives can do their constitutional duty. The construction soldiers work primarily on national economic tasks. For instance, they have accomplished truly exemplary achievements in the construction of the Mukran ferry port, a focal project of our transport and foreign trade sectors. Therefore, there is no good reason to change this.

[ZEIT] You say the churches are not against construction soldiers. Of course, this is correct: They are not against them, they are even happy that they exist. The young people, however, want something else: They want a social peace service; they want to work with handicapped people in hospitals.

[Kessler] There are some young people who want this. You must not generalize on this matter.

[ZEIT] In June, Poland introduced civilian service as an alternative to military service. Especially at the synod of the GDR Federation of Evangelical Churches in Dessau it was said that the MECKLENBURGISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG was banned from being distributed because it had reported this event. Why not? Why is this still a sensitive issue about which public discussion is therefore prevented if possible?

[Kessler] Do you really know what is the new regulation for the alternative service in Poland? I know it very well. It is not so much different from ...

[ZEIT] ... the construction soldiers?

[Kessler] Yes, there is not that much difference. The Poles use the majority of those who have religious motives—those are the ones mentioned in this bill or decree—for national economic focal tasks, and part of them for, let us say, social service.

Our position is the following: Our Constitution obligates everyone to do his service. We have a corresponding law that has been amended over the course of the years, and we tell young people who, for religious reasons, believe they cannot use weapons: Okay, then you will work

under the same material conditions—I mean their pay—for the same period as construction soldiers on a focal project of our national economy.

[ZEIT] Can you imagine that one day this will be extended into the direction of social service, as in Poland?

[Kessler] We want to use the forces where we think they are needed in the national economy. This is, in fact, our main problem. We have hardly any difficulties with the construction soldiers if we closely stick to what our regulations say, but they also have to stick to what we have set down.

[ZEIT] Is your attitude also influenced by the probable demographic development? In the mid-nineties in the FRG we will have the problem in which, due to the low birthrate, it will be impossible to draft all the recruits that are needed.

[Kessler] We have the same problems. In our country the demographic development will be negative until about 1992, when there will then be a very slight upward climb, which will be really felt only in 1994, 1995, and 1996.

[ZEIT] Can you maintain your manpower level nevertheless?

[Kessler] With great difficulty.

[ZEIT] Is this an additional motive for you to disarm?

[Kessler] It is not the decisive, the principal motive. Even if we had more problems in this field or none at all, our desire for disarmament would be the same.

[ZEIT] Until 1962, you had an army of volunteers. Would a professional army be a solution to this problem?

[Kessler] This is conceivable in principle, but we cannot pay for it.

[ZEIT] The National People's Army gives a more "Prussian" impression than the Bundeswehr. Even though the steel helmet now has a new shape, the cut of the uniform, the goose step, the glorification and heroization of the Army—one only has to read the ARMEERUNDSCHAU—are reminiscent of the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. How do you explain following a military past that has been thoroughly discredited?

[Kessler] In the GDR the decisions of the Potsdam agreement have been implemented, the lessons have been drawn from two world wars, and the social roots that led to these wars of aggression—imperialism, militarism, and fascism—have been torn up.

This results in the fact that the National People's Army, which has fashioned its uniforms after the German model and not after the U.S. or Soviet model, is trained in the spirit of the fighters against this Prussian-German militarism, and has been led by active antifascists since its founding.

I think some people are too greatly influenced by the outer appearance of our Army. Of course, some tourists from the FRG, who watch the changing of the honor guard in front of Schinkel's "Neue Wache," might think of "Prussia's Glory." But this changing of the guard takes place at the Unter den Linden Memorial, which is dedicated to the millions of victims of the two world wars, those uncountable Germans who lost their lives as soldiers or prisoners, as victims of the bombings or as concentration camp inmates, as a result of the policy of aggression of German imperialism and militarism—a policy which was militarily pursued by the kaiser's army, by the Reichswehr, and by the Wehrmacht.

And we certainly do not follow the example of these imperialist armies, of this "military past which has been thoroughly discredited," as you correctly say. You yourself noted this in your report on the "Trip to the Other Germany" in 1986. I am sorry that I have to point out that it is not in our Army but rather in the Bundeswehr in which there are regiments, squadrons, barracks, and warships named after military celebrities of the Third Reich, thus consciously perpetuating the traditions of the fascist Wehrmacht.

[ZEIT] Mr Minister, you say that the Western alliance does not recognize the advance concessions made by the Warsaw Pact. What do you have in mind? We have made our own advance concessions and put a big payment on the table: Over the past years we have withdrawn 2,400 nuclear arms from the arsenal that is now deployed in Europe, and now another 364 will follow under the INF Treaty. Where is the reward?

[Kessler] The majority of these 2,400 weapons would have had to be removed anyway, regardless of the armament debate—and they have been replaced by qualitatively better ones.

[ZEIT] You are doing something similar.

[Kessler] I have not denied this. When I talk about advance concessions, I think of the fact that the Soviet Union has suspended its nuclear tests for quite some time. This was a true advance concession, one which has also been linked with a certain risk. It would have been a remarkable step forward if the West had said: "Okay, we will join them for at least a year."

[ZEIT] Is a completely nuclear-free world by the year 2000 not an unrealistic goal? Would it not be better to work toward a less utopian minimization of the potential of deterrence?

[Kessler] We proceed from the premise that the elimination of nuclear weapons is a key to solving the global problems of mankind. The nuclear danger is currently threatening everyone. To ensure survival has become the main task of all of mankind. It is time to overcome the theory and practice of "nuclear deterrence," on which NATO military policy is based.

It was very instructive for me personally to hear at the Berlin international meeting on nuclear-free zones how the belief is spreading in many countries of the world that nuclear deterrence must sooner or later be replaced by the safeguarding of peace through cooperation and political means. Of course, we do not overlook the fact that the international situation is still complicated and contradictory, and that the opponents of any disarmament are stepping up their activities. We do not let ourselves be discouraged by this. We expect that the peace forces will increase in strength and that reason and realism will also continue to gain ground among influential political circles in the NATO states.

[ZEIT] How do you envision a system of cooperative security of the kind that was vaguely outlined by the SED and the SPD in their joint paper of October 1986?

[Kessler] I think that this document is of great importance to all who want peace. It proceeds—and this is not outlined so vaguely at all—from the existence of the alliance systems and of states with different social systems. The document "The Conflict of the Ideologies and Common Security" stresses how important it is to have trust between these two alliance systems and among all their members increase, to have distrust disappear, and to develop forms of cooperation and the exchange of information.

Therefore, statements such as the following ones are of special importance in this document:

- Today peace cannot be achieved by arming against each other but only by coming to an agreement with each other.
- Common security must be organized for all. This demands that each side takes into consideration and respects the legitimate security interest of the other side.
- Each side must grant the other side the same degree of security that it claims for itself.

[ZEIT] These are new ideas for you.

[Kessler] I must tell you frankly that in our country, too, these theses were the result of a process of clarification.

Furthermore, I think that the Helsinki and Stockholm conferences set important milestones on the road toward a European security system. We consider the results of

the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures particularly important, and we are doing everything to fulfill our corresponding obligations.

Already this spring and summer more than 85 generals, officers, and diplomats from 23 CSCE states, including 11 NATO states, observed two exercises on our territory. As during the two inspections that were carried out, they were able to convince themselves that the exercises of the Nation People's Army and of the Soviet Armed Forces on our territory are not threatening.

We are in favor of extending the confidence- and security-building measures to air and naval forces. In this connection, I recall the offer of the USSR to invite maneuver observers to an exercise of the Baltic Fleet.

Finally: The concrete forms of a system of cooperative security are exactly the topics that we want to discuss in talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, between the GDR and the FRG. This is something that could also be discussed by the two defense ministers.

[ZEIT] In January, in Paris, Erich Honecker said that it would be beneficial to the disarmament process if all European states were ready to exercise the utmost restraint in expanding their military potentials. So far our experts do not see any slowing down in the armament of the Warsaw Pact states. General Galvin, NATO commander in chief, recently said that, to his knowledge, the Soviet Union produces 280 tanks every month, which means that every month a tank division is equipped—and this is in a field where there is an enormous superiority, as you have also admitted. How does this tally?

[Kessler] I do not know whether the production figures that you cite are correct; I can neither confirm nor reject them.

[ZEIT] Let us assume that the NATO information is correct!

[Kessler] Well, okay. It is not nice to answer in kind, but when I was on my way to our talk, I heard on the radio that the U.S. Senate has approved money for the construction of about 150 Stealth bombers, which cannot be detected by radar systems and which cost \$0.5 billion each. Now I ask you: Who continues arming? And where?

Therefore: Let us put the cards on the table and start!

Comparison of Reprint of Kessler Interview

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German on 1-2 October on pages 9-10, under the headline "Let Us Put the Cards on the Table and Start," carries a reprint of the 8,100-word interview with General Heinz Kessler, minister for national defense, published by the FRG publication DIE ZEIT on 30 September. The NEUES

DEUTSCHLAND report has been compared with the DIE ZEIT version published in the German Democratic Republic section of the 4 October East Europe DAILY REPORT, revealing the following variations: Page 29, column one, last paragraph, last sentence reads in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND: ...have put the price at DM100 billion; I think that... (changing word "million" to billion") Page 29, column two, last sentence reads in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND: As a result, the corresponding border facilities [grenzanlagen] were created. (changing "border situations" to "border facilities")

Warsaw Pact Military Council Meeting Opens 2 October

Hungary's Karpati Opens Warsaw Pact Meeting
*LD0310203288 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 2 Oct 88*

[Text] Under the chairmanship of Viktor Kulikov, marshal of the Soviet Union, an important meeting on military policy commenced this afternoon in Budapest. Attila Balint reports.

[Balint] The Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact is in session in Budapest. It is the task of this body to hold talks about the training of the allied armies and concrete tasks of cooperation. Thus, there will now be discussions of this year's training results and next year's tasks, as well as development plans for further years.

Also featuring on the agenda will be measures for the implementation of the decisions taken in connection with the defense doctrine at last year's meeting in Berlin of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact.

The Military Council can be called a professional directing body; thus, at this meeting it will not discuss the development of military budgets or reduction of land-based military forces.

In addition to the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov, and his leading colleagues, the member countries are represented by deputy ministers, some leaders of the headquarters staff.

On behalf of the hosts, Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati spoke in his introduction about the further proofs of detente, the results of Soviet foreign policy, but also about the fact that the process of detente has not yet become irreversible.

[Begin Karpati recording] This is proved by facts such as NATO at present unchangingly continuing all its development programs that it started earlier. They are looking for a way to compensate for the absence of the intermediate-range nuclear vehicles which will be dismantled,

destroyed, with other modern traditional means. They are continuing to strive for military superiority, so they can get a more favorable position at any talks.

The political consultative body's session held this year in Warsaw, on the basis of the multi-sided and thorough analysis of the situation, directed our attention to our most important tasks. Of outstanding significance among these is for us to continue, on the basis of collated foreign policy and military policy steps, to initiate proposals directed towards detente and the continuation of dialogue, of talks. We must make efforts to start talks on the reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Europe as soon as possible and to get concrete results. In the course of these talks we must try to eliminate asymmetries, and, keeping in mind mutual security, reach a lower level of armed forces and armaments. [end recording]

Kulikov, Karpati Speak

*LD0310205088 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 2 Oct 88*

[No video available]

[Text] The Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Organization is meeting in Budapest.

[Unidentified reporter] Viktor Kulikov, marshal of the Soviet Union, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces, chairman of the Military Council opened the session.

[Begin Kulikov recording in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] I greet the members of the Military Council, the delegations of the friendly armies who are participating in the meeting. [end recording]

[Reporter] We quote from the speech of Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati.

[Begin Karpati recording] Complicated processes are underway in world politics, which recently have accelerated somewhat. The Soviet-U.S. summits mark the results of this. Alongside all this we must see clearly that the process of detente had not yet become irreversible, because in the West there is very significant opposition to the strengthening of security, the reduction of armaments and weapons. [end recording]

[Reporter] The 38th session of the Military Council will probably last 3 days, behind closed doors.

Warsaw Pact Meeting to Convene in Budapest

Soviet Leaders Arrive in Budapest for Pact Meeting

*LD0210200388 Budapest MTI in English
1840 GMT 2 Oct 88*

[Text] Budapest, October 2 (MTI)—Victor Kulikov, the marshal of the Soviet Union and commander in chief of the Combined Warsaw Treaty Armed Forces, accompanied by Army-General Anatoliy Gribkov, the commander of the staff of the combined armed forces, arrived to Budapest on Sunday. Both of them participate at the 38th meeting of the Military Council of the Warsaw Treaty Member States' Combined Armed Forces, due to be opened on Monday.

Victor Kulikov and his party were welcomed at the Ferihegy Airport by Lieutenant General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence.

Council Meeting To Open 3 Oct

*LD0310071488 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
0700 GMT 3 Oct 88*

[Text] The 38th session of the Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces of the states of the Warsaw Pact starts today in Budapest. The main subject will be the disarmament problem.

GDR Delegation Heads to Geneva Disarmament Talks

*AU0610122088 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 4 Oct 88 p 5*

[Summary] Geneva(ADN)—On 3 October Ambassador Peter Dietze, the new head of the GDR delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference, presented his credentials to Miljan Komatina, general secretary of this conference, who paid tribute to the GDR's dedication in working for arms limitation and disarmament. The two interlocutors assessed the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles as an historic event which opens up the path to new disarmament initiatives, and called for a ban on chemical weapons and nuclear tests. Peter Dietze affirmed that the GDR will continue to actively contribute to solving the tasks faced by the disarmament conference.

Vienna MBFR Talks Progress Reviewed

CSSR Ambassador Gives Views

*LD0610214488 Prague CTK in English
1810 GMT 6 Oct 88*

[Text] Vienna Oct 6 (CTK correspondent)—Though the socialist and NATO countries have been negotiating the conclusion of at least a partial accord here since 1986, that would envisage the removal of a small contingent of

Soviet and U.S. troops from central Europe and subsequent three-year freeze on their arms and troops, no agreement has been reached, Czechoslovak Ambassador Ludek Handl said here today.

Ludek Handl heads a Czechoslovak delegation to the talks on the reduction of arms and troops in central Europe, now in their 46th round and going on for 15 years. He told CTK that the two sides continue to have different fundamental approaches to the main principles of such an agreement, and different views on the control of a partial accord with fixed validity. Characterizing in short the attitude of the West, Ludek Handl said it emphasizes concrete control measures while underestimating concrete disarmament steps.

He stressed that the Warsaw Treaty countries regard a balanced solution to the questions of the principles of the agreement and of control as necessary and possible. However, everything indicates that these differences in the positions of the two sides will not be settled at this disarmament forum.

The Czechoslovak ambassador further said the socialist countries use of the present stage of the Vienna talks for a detailed explanation of Warsaw Treaty initiatives, such as for reduction of troops and conventional weapons in Europe and the Czechoslovak proposal for creating a zone of cooperation and confidence along the borderline between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries. [sentence as received]

Ludek Handl added that work on a mandate of new talks on conventional disarmament in Europe is coming to an end. The new talks will logically cover also the region of central Europe which has been discussed so far with a limited number of NATO member states.

West's Commitment Questioned

*AU0410153088 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 3 Oct 88 p 3*

[Ulyana Prumova article: "At the End of a Long Diplomatic Marathon"]

[Text]Vienna, especially for OTECHESTVEN FRONT: The 45th round of negotiations for the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and the measures connected with them, opened here in Vienna. When the negotiations, which will be remembered by history as the Vienna negotiations, opened on 30 October 1973, the Austrian capital owned neither the ultramodern "Austria Center" conference hall, nor the large, beautiful International Center. The ancient Hofburg palace situated in the city center appeared to be the most convenient place for this important dialogue between 19 NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries, which was greeted with great hopes in those days.

These days, however, the 19 member countries participating in the negotiations gathered for the 45th time in the Redoutensaal of Vienna's Hofburg in order to deliver their farewell statements. Without setting the final seal on a still unfinished diplomatic marathon race, let us try to understand why it has reached the present critical situation. From the very beginning of the Vienna negotiations to the present moment, two fundamentally different approaches emerged and were maintained. The socialist countries, basing themselves on the truly existing, approximate balance of forces, propose a mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments that should take place on the basis of equal amounts and percentages. This would guarantee the preservation of the existing balance of forces, even on a lower level. Over the last 15 years of negotiations in Vienna, the NATO member countries have insisted on an "assymetrical" disarmament to their own advantage. Speaking in very general terms, we can say that they defended their aspiration for one-sided military superiority and shifting the balance of forces to their advantage. The Western proposals did not contain the new element—disarmament measures. They placed the emphasis on verification measures and omitted the main thing—that verification is obligatory, but is nevertheless a result of an already agreed disarmament. This unconstructive position of the West made the negotiations hopeless, and prompts the question of whether they will be capable of preserving their nature and goals. The deadlock at which these negotiations—which appeared so promising in their time—have now arrived reminds us that overcoming the great amount of distrust and suspicion accumulated over the years between East and West is a prolonged and difficult process. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached between the USSR and the United States to eliminate an entire class of weapons. Why is there no progress in Vienna, in view of these circumstances? Regardless of how paradoxical it may sound, we must say that both the success achieved by the INF Treaty, as well as the lack of success at the Vienna negotiations, provide evidence of the same thing—that an agreement can be achieved only on the basis of equality and equal security. The realities of our epoch require a mutual and well-balanced observance of each other's legitimate interests. To date, the West has failed to demonstrate its observance. The progress of the Vienna negotiations and the reasons for their lack of success will be analyzed and discussed from now on. This is the reason why we should not be too hasty in drawing conclusions and learning lessons. The 45th round is just beginning.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSSR FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH BEFORE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

AU1210101088 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
8 Oct 88 p 3

[CTK report on speech by Bohuslav Chnoupek, CSSR minister of foreign affairs, to the 43d session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 7 October: "Czechoslovakia and the Problems of the Contemporary World"]

[Excerpts] New York—Bohuslav Chnoupek, CSSR minister of foreign affairs, delivered a speech in the general

debate at the 43d session of the UN General Assembly in New York on Friday [7 October].

In the opening part, he expressed great appreciation for the untiring activity of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, aimed at reducing tension in the world and solving regional conflicts through negotiations. He stressed, in particular, the fact that, thanks to his initiatives and efforts, the UN has achieved important new successes and fulfilled the noble role entrusted to it by the nations at its birth.

In international relations, he continued, we have been witnessing events of truly unique significance. The new political thinking is already being displayed by them. The parting of ways with the militant mentality and a greater openness have begun. A readiness to negotiate pragmatically and in a civilized manner is strengthening. This hopeful shift leads to relations being built among states on the balance of interests, a strengthening of the role of international law, and a humanization of international relations, that is, to the comprehensive resolving of the problem of the survival of civilization as a task for the whole of humanity.

These problems, of course, cannot be resolved in arenas of irreconcilable confrontation, but only in fields of creative cooperation. This is the philosophy at the turn of this and the coming millenium, which should bring about new quality in relations in the world and on the regional scale. That, of course, requires that one look at new phenomena through new eyes. Making solvable what until recently was insoluble. Making the unthinkable thinkable. Making possible what only yesterday was impossible.

The correctness of this path is attested to by the four Soviet-American meetings on the highest level. They have made the world safer, peace stronger, and the future more secure. The ratification of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles—the first action of the era of real disarmament—was a milestone of fundamental importance. We were one of the eight states directly involved in the process of bringing it about. We did everything that was necessary. We adopted appropriate verification measures on our territory. The Soviet operational-tactical missiles stationed in our country since the end of 1983 were removed even before the treaty went into effect.

For Comprehensive Security

We—all of us—must ask the following question: What next? How can one maintain what nations have built in their common interest? How can one develop everything that sober-minded politician have agreed on? The unequivocal answer is: "Let us compete in humanness!" Let us put into the foreground what unites all of us: survival and the continuation of history! Let us have a competition which—despite all political, ideological, weltanschauung, and other differences—will make it

possible for nations and individuals to acquire existential security; demilitarize international relations; and avert social and ecological catastrophes. And, in this way, arrive at new horizons of mutually advantageous cooperation.

In this spirit our organization has to say a decisive word on the fundamental strengthening of multilateralism. It has a much greater ability to create trust and achieve results than any other of its alternatives. In his report this year, the UN Secretary General notes that when global problems call for global solutions, the value of the UN is generally obvious to all member states. Without strengthening its influence we will become the subject of ever increasing worldwide instability.

From this there also proceeds the concept of comprehensive security. It includes all dimensions of international relations. It corresponds to the need to elevate the interests of the whole of humanity to the fundamental constant of international politics. It serves as an impetus for a broad, constructive dialogue about everything that can be done to substantially enhance the UN's role in the contemporary world.

B. Chnoupek further stressed that the positive developments in the world have created favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the objectives of restructuring and all spheres of our society's life.

He also recalled this year's important anniversaries—the 70th anniversary of the founding of independent Czechoslovakia and the 50th anniversary of the so-called Munich Agreement, adopted about us but—without us. Its warning, he said, remains a timeless lesson. Security was and is common and indivisible. We recall the historical experience, both from the two world wars and the four decades of the socialist road of development. It obliges us to conduct an active and constructive policy of peaceful cooperation.

Proposal To Establish a Zone of Trust

The proposal to establish a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, submitted by Comrade Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, is an expression of this policy. We proceed from the fact that it is precisely the states along this line that bear a special responsibility, and it is precisely along this line that the stockpiles of military devices are greatest, and thus any misunderstanding most dangerous, and confrontation most hazardous.

Therefore, we submit a plan for the peaceful strengthening of the guarantees of security without confrontation in that zone by means of both military and non-military measures. In this we intend to proceed on the basis of a Europe-wide process, and thus create an impetus to deepen it further. To do this, we must all shed the burdens of the past, of course; rid ourselves of the

accustomed models of thinking in terms of blocs; drop the picture of the enemy; measure the boldness of man's deed not by the yardstick of militancy, but by the ability to overcome one-sidedness and false military ambitions.

Our proposal subordinates relations in the military sphere to the principle of reasonable sufficiency. We want to strengthen confidence-building measures, fulfill and further develop the conclusions of the Stockholm conference, whether it concerns military exercises, including advance notification, the limitation of the number of participants, the invitation of observers, or the right of inspection. We want to jointly compare military doctrines with a view to giving them a purely defensive character. Together with our allies, we propose, in the context of the Europe-wide reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons on the basis of mutual elimination of imbalances and asymmetries of individual kinds, to remove the most dangerous offensive weapons from the zone along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. We listened with exceptional attention to the valuable proposals of President F. Mitterrand that went in the same direction. They strengthen our conviction that the dialogue will intensively continue.

At the same time it is also necessary to strive to develop the nonmilitary security factors. Therefore, our proposal organically includes the political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian spheres. Measures in the appropriate spheres could even exceed the Europe-wide agreed parameters in the zone of trust.

The projected possibilities for peaceful cooperation are practically inexhaustible. What we mean is setting up joint ventures; establishing free trade zones; improving transportation and power engineering infrastructure; simplifying customs and visa practices; environmental protection; helping in cases of natural disaster; expanding friendly contacts; establishing direct relations between schools, scientific institutes, cultural institutions, and youth organizations; and providing mutual health assistance in border regions.

By all this we aim to create a mechanism of a regular political dialogue among states of both parts of Europe on a broad and firm basis. Here we are linking onto further proposals of socialist countries, as well as onto constructive attitudes and views of Western partners. We are open to any practical suggestions and recommendations.

Concept for Reducing Armaments

We favor the fastest possible mutual, radical reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons on the continent, without which the danger of military confrontation would continue. The July session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw yielded new, far-reaching proposals: Eliminating the asymmetry in weapons and armed forces, followed by

reducing them by roughly 25 percent, that is, by 500,000 troops on each side, and continuing this process until a situation is created when the military potential of the two sides acquires a purely defensive character. All this is to be done in three carefully balanced stages. Thus our countries have taken a constructive step in the effort to meet the positions of the NATO countries halfway. Our countries have come forward with a realistic concept for reduction.

We are pressing for an accelerated successful conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna. It should adopt a balanced document that is full in content. It should also establish the mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament. We agree with Minister H.-D. Genscher that this should happen this October. Yes, the meeting has produced a lot of responsible work. Foundations for the adoption of good agreements have been created. They will make it possible to develop Europe-wide cooperation extensively. A constructive approach to the matter now requires political decisiveness to finalize the agreement, the outlines of which are emerging, and demonstrate political will in all discussed issues.

Therefore, we propose that an economic forum be one of the next actions. It could assess all problems of cooperation in that sphere. We are prepared to host it.

Thus we jointly wish to elevate the Europe-wide process to a qualitatively higher level to correspond to the realities of the times, affirm the viability of the concept of the common European home, based on the diversity of the social choice made by nations, give it a firm foundation and bold construction, and ensure that Europe speaks with one voice to the world.

On the New Quality of International Relations

Today we have no more pressing mission than to ensure that the process of disarmament become irreversible. With this in mind we approached the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly. Unfortunately, it ended without a final document. But it was a useful experience, as well as a lesson. We can extensively draw from the submitted proposals. For our part, we examined and incorporated them in the joint memorandum of the Warsaw Pact member states, entitled "Security Through Disarmament," as well as in a number of other documents. I will mention, above all, the joint project of the CSSR, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and the USSR, aimed at establishing an international mechanism to verify observance of the agreements on reducing tension, limiting arms buildup, and on the military situation in the conflict regions, which would operate under the aegis of the United Nations. We welcome the fact that numerous interesting proposals by other countries also address this theme. Let us do all we can so that one day we will not be compelled to note that the conclusion, that the solution, of this or that issue was beyond the potential of control.

Let the path to the new quality of international relations be illuminated by the triad "trust-security-cooperation." Ridding the world of the nuclear arms race remains the main global task. Therefore, an early conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty on a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons should become the fundamental step in the right direction, while strictly observing the ABM Treaty, for the link between them is profound and organic. We favor an immediate halt to nuclear weapons tests. We support the development of international cooperation in making use of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes.

The proposal by the Governments of the CSSR and the GDR to establish a corridor without nuclear weapons in central Europe has acquired a quite concrete place in the effort to limit and avert the nuclear threat, too. We support the establishment of similar zones in other parts of the world as well, especially in the Balkans and in Scandinavia.

It is high time to eliminate all obstacles that prevent the conclusion of an agreement on a total ban and scrapping of chemical weapons. We are ready to join it from the very beginning. We neither produce nor possess such weapons. Further procrastination regarding the preparation of the agreement only helps their dissemination and increases the risk of their being used. In this connection we have noted a change in the attitude of France. We hope that this will make the path to the agreement easier. Together with other countries, we are filled with consternation as the result of the beginning of the production of binary devices by the United States of America and the possibility of them being stationed in Europe. Together with the GDR we propose the establishment of a zone without chemical weapons in central Europe. As a contractual party to the 1925 Geneva protocol on the nonuse of chemical weapons in a war, we also regard the idea of convening a conference of its signatory states as thought-provoking.

Let Us Enhance the Role of the UN [subhead]

We are of the opinion that it is necessary to enhance the role of our organization in respect to limiting the buildup of conventional arms. We also believe that the idea of setting up a register of the trade of weapons at the UN would contribute to that.

We are in favor of expanding international cooperation in the peaceful use of space, which the UN has proclaimed as being mankind's joint bequest. It would be unpardonable to be indifferent to the threat of it being misused for military objectives.

We are in favor of enhancing the effectiveness of the disarmament mechanism, above all the Geneva disarmament conference. As we proposed last February, it should gradually become the permanent universal body for disarmament negotiations.

We regard the peaceful settlement of international disputes and regional conflicts to be the necessary prerequisite for the establishment of general security. The fruitful Soviet-American dialogue is beneficially reflected in it. Improving relations between East and West also brings calm for seeking and finding just solutions in long lasting and dangerous hotbeds of tension. Full use must be made of this. And that is why an active UN role becomes indispensable.

Therefore, we welcome the fact that the importance of the "Blue Berets" in eliminating the sensitive spots on our planet is growing. They symbolize one of the most important aspects of the UN activity—operations to maintain peace.

Together with the world public, we received with good hopes the signing of the Geneva agreement on Afghanistan, which was concluded with the participation of the UN Secretary General, the joint guarantors of which are the world's two mightiest countries. The well-known steps of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are an example of a responsible, conscientious fulfillment of assumed commitments. In this connection we stress the fundamental demand that they be consistently observed by all signatories. Only in this way will it be possible to ensure peace for the Afghan people and the entire region.

We have equally welcomed the positive turn that has occurred in the Persian Gulf region on the basis of a UN resolution. The fact that nonsensical bloodshed was halted with the help of the UN gives us grounds for satisfaction. We are unequivocally in favor of the further continuation of the negotiations under the UN secretary general's aegis.

Realistic prerequisites for a peaceful settlement of problems in southern Africa have emerged. We hope that the ongoing tripartite talks between Angola, Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa with U.S. participation will bring about the independence of Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 and also pacify the situation in the entire region. The efforts of the UN and the entire international community must more consistently concentrate on putting a complete and immediate end to the shameful apartheid policy practiced by the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

We welcome the shift that has occurred on the basis of the Esquipulas II agreement in Central America. However, we note with regret that the foreign support for the counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua continues to complicate the situation in the region and the development of the peace process.

In convening an international conference on the Middle East conflict under the aegis of the United Nations we see the way to resolving the conflict jointly and for good. The uprising in the occupied territories again illustrates

that the core of the solution is the Palestinian question. The start of the work of the preparatory committee of the conference would help the matter.

We continue to favor a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem while ensuring the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and maintaining its nonaligned status.

We fully support the constructive efforts of the DPRK aimed at reducing international tension on the Korean peninsula and at the country's peaceful unification. Thanks to that effort, the prerequisites for the establishment of a pragmatic dialogue have improved.

We are satisfied with the favorable developments in the Horn of Africa, especially in connection with the important peace agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia. We also support the joint effort of Ethiopia and Sudan aimed at strengthening their mutual peace relations and cooperation.

The developments regarding the settlement of the situation in Western Sahara are a contribution to the improvement of the international atmosphere.

We follow with satisfaction and support the efforts aimed at a political settlement of the Cambodian issue and the problem of peace and stability in southeast Asia. We favor the development of the results of the informative meeting in Jakarta. The ongoing 50 percent reduction of the number of Vietnamese volunteers in Cambodia creates favorable prerequisites for positive developments in that region, too.

We regard the seven-point USSR program for strengthening peace in the Asian-Pacific region to be a significant impetus.

We welcome the positive trend in asserting the role of the UN Security Council in resolving international disputes and conflicts. In accordance with this, it also would be a good idea to begin convening periodical sessions of the council on the level of ministers of foreign affairs and, if needed, also in regions of tension, as proposed by Minister Shevardnadze. An improved cooperation among the standing members of the Security Council yields fruitful results. We also appreciate the deepening collaboration between the Council and the UN Secretary General. We are in favor of adopting a draft of a declaration on forestalling and eliminating disputes and situations that could endanger international peace and security. The UN can today do really more for peace than has been the case until now.

The CSSR Favors New Economic Order [subhead]

Czechoslovakia consistently favors democratic restructuring of international economic relations. We cannot allow it to lag behind the hopeful developments in other spheres. We cannot ignore the growth of forces and

processes that already now create mistrust and insecurity in the world economy and threaten an unprecedented international economic crisis in the future. Our common future would rest on treacherous foundations if we do not bridge the gulf between the developed and developing countries. Therefore, it is necessary to create a new international economic order.

We regard it necessary to continue the international dialogue on the realization of the principle of disarmament for the benefit of development, and gradually transform the conclusions of last year's UN conference into concrete measures. In the document produced by the Political Consultative Committee of the July session in Warsaw, we drew attention to the fact that it is also necessary to pay particular attention to the dangerous consequences of the arms buildup to the environment.

We can no longer passively reconcile ourselves to the ecological threat, to this literal time bomb which we have jointly and shortsightedly created. The conclusions of the report of the World Ecology and Development Commission, as well as of the document "The Prospects for the Environment Up to the Year 2000 and Afterwards," must be implemented immediately.

This year in our country we adopted a new concept for environmental protection until the end of the century. In order that ecological factors not undermine stability and peaceful relations, we have submitted a proposal for creating an international ecological security system. It should be based on mutually acceptable principles of cooperation and conduct of states in that sphere. We

support the idea of coordinating efforts on these issues and holding a series of international meetings that would culminate with the convening of a UN conference on the environment in 1992.

We intend to continue to contribute to the deepening of international cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, as well as in the sphere of human rights. The continued crude and mass violation of human rights in many parts of the world is truly one of the most despicable features of our time. One must not become reconciled to it.

The role of international law must be particularly strengthened. It is necessary to ensure that it prevails in relations among states. It is necessary to continue enhancing its effectiveness through codification, progressive development, and consistent implementation. We welcome the USSR's stimulating idea aimed at working out a long-term program for the development of international law, oriented toward issues concerning security, trust, and cooperation. We share the view about the priority significance of legal guarantees of comprehensive security. We are considering how to contribute our share to the strengthening of the role of the International Court of Justice.

In conclusion B. Chnoupek stressed that the urgency of the tasks facing the international community requires the strengthening of mutual cooperation and coordination.

"Let us keep in mind the decisive importance of the time factor—this merciless arbiter of history. By means of constructive efforts we are discovering new ways to solve the problems of our time. We are building morals and ethics worthy of international relations in the period to come," he said.

The Czechoslovak delegation was given the mandate to pursue such a course by its government, and it will honestly fulfill it.

**West European Countries in SDI
and Eureka Programs**

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[R. Shchenin, A. Khlystov report on MEMO roundtable
discussion]

[Text] On the initiative on the Center for West European Studies a discussion took place in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO of the first results of West European countries' participation in the American "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program and realization of the Eureka regional S&T cooperation program. Specialists from the IMEMO, the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute (ISKAN), Moscow State University, the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), the USSR Permanent CEMA Delegation, the CEMA International Institute of Economic Problems of the World Socialist System (MIEP MSS), the USSR Gosplan Comprehensive Transport Problems Institute (IKTP), the USSR Academy of Sciences Space Research Institute (IKI) and a number of other institutes and field organizations took part in the discussion.

Opening the discussion, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Shenayev proposed dwelling on an analysis of the factors which prompted West European government and business circles to participate in the SDI and answering the following questions. In what do West European interests coincide with American interests and in what do they differ? Has the United States achieved the political, military-strategic and economic goals which it linked to the enlistment of West European countries in the SDI program? Have West European firms' hopes of acquiring the latest S&T knowhow and techniques been justified? What are the prospects of realization of SDI program agreements?

The question of the "European Defense Initiative" (EDI) concept was brought up for discussion also. The participants had the job of determining its essence and connection with the SDI. Finally, it was important to assess the opportunities of the peace forces in West Europe for supporting the initiatives of the Soviet Union and the socialist community aimed at easing international tension, disarmament and the development of multilateral cooperation in Europe.

Debate on the political and economic aspects of West European countries' participation in the SDI then began.

The main aims pursued by the top military and political leadership of the United States in enlisting West Europe in the SDI, Candidate of Economic Sciences R. Shchenin (IMEMO) believes, were strengthening the unity of members of the North Atlantic alliance; associating with the SDI program the firms of countries which are not NATO members; taking advantage of the S&T potential

of West European states. Aligning themselves with the SDI, these countries aspired to preserve the existing military and political ties to the leader of NATO and consolidate their positions in the bloc, enhance their S&T level and secure participation in the possible production of components of a future ABM system.

Certain data characterizing the scale of different countries' participation in realization of the SDI program were adduced. Specifically, in Great Britain firms and research institutions may participate in the SDI in 18 areas of research. In the FRG a desire to participate in the SDI has been declared by hundreds of firms, but 30 of them approximately have realistic opportunities. In the period 1986-1992 they will at best obtain contracts worth a sum total of \$50-80 million. In Italy firms interested in the SDI have formed a special consortium, whose nucleus is composed of Agusta, Breda meccanica, Electronica, Galileo Marconi Italiana and others.

West European firms' hopes of acquiring the latest S&T knowhow and techniques and also obtaining big profits have yet to be justified. The countries of the region contemplate winning prior to 1992 SDI contracts worth \$3 billion, that is, 10 percent of the sum total of outlays on the entire program in the said period. But competent Western experts believe that in reality they will obtain no more than \$300 million. The association of West European countries with the SDI at the government level will most likely be confined to the above-mentioned Great Britain, the FRG and Italy.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. Rubinskiy (IMEMO) emphasized that appreciable changes have occurred in West European countries' positions in the period since proclamation of the SDI program. The first reaction was negative, but the U.S. Administration succeeded in changing the minds of the governments of these countries, intimidating them with the idea of severe S&T lagging. The results of the first year of participation in the SDI have disappointed the West European countries economically and financially. The political results, on the other hand, are evaluated by their governments as propitious.

In the opinion of Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Arbatov (IMEMO), the decision concerning the attachment of West European countries to the SDI was basically of a political nature. The United States managed to make this program a kind of "test of the solidarity" of the allies and prove to them the "soundness" of its foreign policy course. All this was buttressed by promises to afford the United States' allies access to progressive American technology with outlets to the civilian sphere of research and production. That when joining the SDI program the United States' allies made a number of essential stipulations, including those concerning non-violation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, calls attention to itself.

The speeches of Doctor of Historical Sciences D. Melamid (IMEMO), Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Likhotal, Candidate of Technical Sciences B. Antonyuk (GKNT), Candidate of Historical Sciences G. Sturua (IMEMO), Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Savelyev (IMEMO), A. Pikayev (IMEMO) and others analyzed the points of concurrence and divergence of the interests of the United States and West Europe in respect of the SDI.

The United States' West European NATO allies evaluate the problems associated with the SDI through the prism of ensuring an East-West balance of forces whereby the high dependability of American "security guarantees" is achieved. The duplicity of their position amounts to the fact that while displaying alarm in connection with the danger of an arms race in space they are nonetheless remaining loyal to their senior partner.

In the long term West European countries see the SDI as a program whose results it is impossible to predict. They see as its main danger the possible undermining of the process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms and the corresponding ABM limitation accords.

The West European countries' positions in respect of the SDI vary greatly. The aspirations of different political forces are contradictory also. Washington sorely needs the allies' political support. The R. Reagan administration now has the long-awaited opportunity to refer to this support to obtain resources for the SDI from Congress. But only time will tell whether the "deal of the century" will remain good and to what consequences it will lead from the viewpoint of the future of West Europe and the stability of transatlantic relations.

Economic and S&T aspects of West Europe's participation in the SDI were analyzed in detail in the course of the discussion. The speeches of Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Grigoryev (IMEMO), Candidate of Economic Sciences R. Gumen (GKNT), Candidate of Economic Sciences N. Krichigina (IMEMO), Candidate of Technical Sciences B. Komzin (IMEMO), Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Korovkin (IMEMO) and others analyzed and contrasted the interests of the United States and West European countries in the performance of joint R&D in respect of the SDI program and evaluated the consequences of such cooperation.

The sphere of the greatest concurrence of the interests of militarist circles of the United States and West Europe is application of results of SDI program research for the creation of new arms systems. However, the support for this program in West Europe is determined not only by military-political and military-strategic considerations but also interests of economic and S&T development. The managers of West European research centers and firms manufacturing science-intensive products are hoping thanks to SDI contracts to obtain additional

resources for research work. Participation in the program, they believe, will permit their introduction to the latest S&T achievements and emergence on the American science-intensive product market.

For its part, the United States is attempting to make use of the S&T potential of West European firms. The choice of concept of a future ABM system may be based only on the specific developments and actual possibilities of the firms in production of the requisite components. Whence the American leadership's interest in the speediest acquisition of ideas and the maximum use of the potential at the allies' disposal. The SDI program may also be used by the United States as a more subtle instrument of increased technology and export control of the potentially promising S&T activity of West European competitors.

As Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Presnyakov (IMEMO) observed, SDI contracts are as yet few, but they are being realized on the crest of S&T progress. Leading firms—the weapons "smithies" in the West European region—are being attracted to them. The stipulation contained in the model "memoranda of understanding" according to which all contentious issues pertaining to technology transfer will be settled in accordance with current U.S. legislation could in the future be highly inconvenient for the West European countries.

SDI program projects are only just being developed. A preliminary study of various military-technical aspects of the problem is under way. For this reason the speakers' assessments applied only to the initial period of individual West European countries' participation in the SDI.

As Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Shein (Moscow State University) said in his speech, Great Britain's position in respect of the SDI can only be understood in the overall context of Anglo-American relations. Importance is undoubtedly attached to the military-political course of the Conservative government, which is leading the country in the wake of the policy of the senior partner. The close relationship of the military-industrial complexes of the United States and Great Britain and also the intensification of the international nature of military business operate in this same direction. A change in Great Britain's policy in respect of the SDI is not to be expected.

In the opinion of M. Bogdanov (the newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA), from the moment of inception of the American SDI concept in 1983 through the present Great Britain has occupied a dual position in respect of it. On the one hand it fears that the program, having undermined the 1972 treaty limiting ABM systems, will undermine strategic stability and strike irreparably at the nuclear arms control process. On the other, the Conservative government proceeds from the fact that realization of the program without West Europe would intensify its technology lag. Participation

in SDI research, however, will, London hopes, afford access to the latest American technology. As a whole, Great Britain's position in respect of the American space plans remains guarded, at least. The British leadership is opposed to the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty and emphasizes that British participation in the SDI is confined exclusively to the research stage.

As follows from the speech of Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Varnavskiy (IMEMO), a nucleus of the industrial firms which undoubtedly support the SDI and which have potential, and in some cases, actual opportunities for winning orders is visible in the FRG. In speaking of the impact of the SDI on the country's economic development it needs to be borne in mind that the SDI is intensifying the activity of military-industrial firms and contributing to the elimination of logjams in the military sectors.

The opinion prevails in military-political circles in France, Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Chervyakov (IMEMO) observed, that realization of the SDI in full, like the adoption of retaliatory measures, would call in question the country's entire existing security system. The sixth program of development of the armed forces for 1987-1991, adopted in the spring of 1987, is geared both to a qualitative upgrading of and quantitative increase in the national nuclear potential. It is obvious that France intends exerting the maximum effort to multiply its nuclear potential and preserve and strengthen its positions of third nuclear power.

The essence of Spain's position, A. Landabaso (IMEMO) believes, is primarily the fact that its government advocates compliance with the provisions of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty. It considers also that a space-based ABM system must in no event be deployed until the possibilities of negotiations are exhausted. The government has no intention of consenting to an agreement with the United States like that concluded by the FRG and Great Britain. At the same time it permits the participation in the SDI of private firms.

The countries of NATO's southern flank (Greece, Turkey), Candidate of Historical Sciences S. Andreyev (IMEMO) said, lack the technological possibilities for active participation in the SDI. Nonetheless, their political support for this program and its counterpart—the EDI—are of particular significance. After all, the center of gravity of the American military infrastructure in the Mediterranean pertains to these countries. In addition, purely technically the system to whose creation the SDI is geared will need tracking and reconnaissance stations on the territory of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. And, finally, from the political viewpoint support for the SDI by the governments of South European countries is extremely important for the United States in view of the fact that this is the weakest, most unstable flank of NATO.

Despite the appreciable differentiation of foreign policy courses, the approaches to the SDI program which were adopted originally have been preserved in the North European countries, in the assessment of Candidate of Historical Sciences K. Voronov (IMEMO). Given the present alignment of domestic political forces, some retreat from the refusal to support the program recorded in 1986 at the Social Democratic Labor Party congress can hardly be expected in Sweden, for example. A negative position in respect of the SDI has been occupied by Finland. Denmark is opposed to the deployment of arms in space and participation in R&D into space-based arms. Norway was one of the first NATO countries to declare its negative attitude toward the SDI. However, this approach has under different cabinets been suffused with varying content. As a whole, the northern NATO members tacitly approve bloc resolutions which without mentioning the SDI support the basic provisions of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty and draw a distinction between civil and military R&D in space.

The roundtable participants discussed the essence and focus of the EDI concept. As Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kalyadin (IMEMO), Candidate of Historical Sciences G. Kolosov (IMEMO) and others maintain, individual propositions of this concept may be interpreted variously. Whence the contradictoriness and ambiguity of the assessments thereof both in the United States and in West European countries. Some "Euro-peist" politicians of the West have discerned in the EDI an aspiration to complete the creation of a system of West European military-political cooperation, achieve greater independence and enhance the military-political role of West Europe. Such an approach, however, has not gained appreciable support in NATO and has been greeted very guardedly by representatives of the U.S. Administration.

The participants in the discussion concluded that a regional ABM system which would protect the West European region in the event of a nuclear conflict cannot as yet be discerned even theoretically. Furthermore, Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. Kostko (IMEMO) added, even a conflict involving the use of conventional weapons in densely populated Europe with its tremendous number of facilities of increased danger (nuclear powers stations, radiochemical and chemical enterprises and so forth) could lead to a catastrophe whose consequences are hard to predict. The way to the sure protection of the region against nuclear and other weapons may lie not via an EDI but only via the creation of a system of international, including European, security and by way of a reduction in and the elimination of weapons of mass annihilation and the adoption of other measures.

The debate on current and future aspects of the development of the Eureka program began with the speech of Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Shenayev, who raised a number of questions of importance for study of the program. First of all, is Eureka West Europe's answer to the technology challenge of the United States or a

supplement to the SDI? An opportunity has emerged even now for assessing the significance of this program and its effectiveness per the results of specific projects. Considerations have been expressed recently concerning the military focus of Eureka or, at least, the possibility of its use for this purpose. The question of the degree and nature of the interest in the program of individual West European countries, firms and governments and the European Communities Commission is pertinent. It is also necessary to assess the possibilities of S&T cooperation between members of the EC and CEMA, primarily along the lines of Eureka and the Comprehensive Program of the CEMA Countries' S&T progress.

Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Khlystov (IMEMO) observed that the participants aspire to make Eureka a most important component of the competitive struggle with the United States and Japan for S&T leadership. The program is seen as the first step en route to the "technological" unification of West Europe and the formulation of a common regional policy in the field of technology. For this reason its realization could contribute to increased coordination of action both within the framework of international S&T cooperation agreements which have already been concluded and important national programs. Some 165 projects corresponding to the requirements of industrial and scientific circles have been approved. Approximately 600 firms and research institutions are already members of the Eureka club.

It is advisable when evaluating future prospects to consider primarily the possibility of the program reaching the level of firms outside of the region. The economic interest of West European firms in the preservation of relations with subcontractors from countries of other regions and the West European affiliates of American and Japanese TNC will most likely prevent retention of the program within the confines of West Europe.

Eureka has now attained a level at which its further destiny has in fact ceased to depend on the amount of resources allocated from government sources. The refinement within the framework of the program of a new mechanism of regional S&T cooperation based on the maximum initiative from "below," at the microlevel, could ultimately lead to a change in the role of the supranational body of management of the program in the shape of the intergovernmental conference and an extension of the list of questions tackled on a more current basis by the firms and research centers themselves.

Candidate of Economic Sciences R. Gumen dwelt on questions of management of the program. Besides the intergovernmental conference, which adopts decisions pertaining to the rules, determines the strategy of its official stimulation and regulation and represents the highest level of leadership, a further two levels in its management structure may be distinguished. At the middle level intergovernmental conferences are prepared, the priority areas of work are shaped, projects are selected, their participants and performance timeframes

are determined and questions of financing are specified. The main role here belongs to a special group of high-ranking representatives of the participating states, who are simultaneously the national coordinators in respect of realization of the program in their own country. The program's permanent secretariat, which lacks decision-making authority, pertains to the middle tier of management also. A big part is played by the third level in the shape of industrial firms with full autonomy in management of the projects. It is they which provide mainly for the financing of the program.

Doctor of Economic Sciences L. Glukharev (Moscow State University) observed that three types of S&T programs with different levels of regulation have taken shape currently in the capitalist countries. These are national, the SDI, for example; inter-nation, of the Eureka type, with an autonomous international, predominantly private-monopoly, regulation mechanism created for the purpose of the development of a regional new technology market and West Europe's technological revival; supranational, of the Esprit, Brite and other programs type used by the Community to stimulate integration processes in West Europe in the sphere of science and technology and to create a "European Technology Community". The S&T programs of the Community and Eureka not only complement one another but also compete between themselves.

Candidate of Economic Sciences I. Nerushenko (IMEMO) expressed a somewhat different viewpoint. She believes that EC programs pertaining to the development of new technology and Eureka pursue common goals. They do not compete but complement one another, and the ECC's participation in Eureka is geared primarily to the avoidance of duplication.

In the opinion of Candidate of Economic Sciences N. Shelyubskaya (IMEMO) and Candidate of Technical Sciences B. Komzin, the first results of the development of Eureka are quite modest. West European countries with a high level of S&T development (Great Britain, the FRG) are assigning the program the role of stimulator of interfirm cooperation. The program incorporates projects whose realization was developed long before it was officially approved. And some of them duplicate work being performed per EC programs, what is more.

Eureka should be seen as a new component of the West European S&T infrastructure, and as such for industrial companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones, it plays the part of a kind of "information club". The program supplements EC activity in the field of standardization and the development of new methods of management of multilateral projects, and the integration of Eureka and the S&T programs of the EC may be expected in the future.

It is unlikely that Eureka will be capable of changing appreciably the balance of S&T potentials of the three main centers of imperialism which had taken shape by

the mid-1980's. This is connected with the scale of West Europe's technological lag behind the United States and Japan and the inadequacy of the resources allocated within the framework of the program for reducing this lag. Nor may the involvement in the sphere of integration of such countries as Austria, Finland and Greece alter the situation on account of the narrowness of their S&T potentials. The subject matter of the projects encompasses a wide spectrum of research, and the resources allocated for its realization are negligible compared with the level of financing of such work by the American and Japanese competitors.

Indeed, Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Slavinskiy (IMEMO) emphasized, in the organizational plane (without guaranteed financial backing for the R&D programs and without the powers to control their realization) Eureka creates the impression of some "information club". Nonetheless, as an important political initiative it has scored a significant success, having awoken widespread interest in the building of a "technological Europe". But it is in need of economic and legal backing, and this is currently the main problem.

The realization of Eureka, Candidate of Economic Sciences N. Krichigina believes, is designed to contribute ultimately to the implementation of a common industrial policy, the achievement of genuine economic integration and the creation in the region of a common economic area. These processes already go beyond the EC framework (thus at the end of 1986 almost all EFTA countries declared their desire to participate in the Community's research programs), and Eureka is further testimony to this. At the same time, however, many leading industrial concerns prefer to participation in Eureka a broadening of ties to American and Japanese companies.

Eureka is obliged for its appearance, Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Tsirenschikov (IMEMO) emphasized, aside from political factors, to the insufficient efficiency of the S&T programs of the EC and traditional interfirm cooperation agreements. Even today it is distinguished by comparatively bigger opportunities for adaptation to the requirements of the current stage of S&T progress, the development of innovative entrepreneurial initiative, flexibility in management and the effective use of information as a production resource. At the same time, however, in terms of forms of realization the program reflects the neoconservative tilt in the S&T policy of the majority of leading West European countries. States' orientation predominantly toward indirect measures of encouragement of the development of science and technology extends to Eureka also.

Singularities of the development of a number of priority areas of S&T progress within the Eureka framework were examined in the speeches of A. Fesenko (IMEMO), V. Shultseva (IMEMO), Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Grigoryev and Candidate of Economic Sciences L. Fedorova (IKTP).

Eureka is paying the most earnest attention to the development of microelectronics inasmuch as West Europe depends to a considerable extent on Japan and the United States in the field of computer chip support and data processing.

It is planned spending in the next 6-8 years some \$700-800 million on production automation and robotics projects, which is approximately 10 times less than the total annual expenditure of Great Britain, the FRG and France on national programs for stimulating the production of flexible automation facilities. The realization of these projects could eliminate the lag in the development of third-generation industrial robots with artificial intelligence componentry and the flexible automation of manufacturing processes in electronics industry. The projects are geared to the removal of logjams in the componentry of electronics and are based on the high S&T level of the traditional sectors of industry manufacturing modern means of automation like machine-tool building, for example. By the mid-1980's West Europe had surpassed the United States threefold in terms of the manufacture of machine tools with program control; the pool of industrial robots in West European countries numbered (1985) 26,000 compared with 20,000 in the United States, nor is the region inferior in terms of the number of installed flexible manufacturing systems.

However, a lag behind the United States and Japan has come to light in the field of communications systems production. Projects in this sphere in the Eureka program are characterized by a narrowly specialized thrust and provide for the development and production of electronic switching equipment, fiber-optic equipment, information nets linking various production and research centers, the establishment of all-European equipment and communications network standards and the creation of an all-European wide-band digital communications network. Altogether the enumerated communication facilities will account for approximately 14 percent of the total estimated cost of Eureka projects which have already been approved.

Intensive development is also under way in West Europe in the field of fundamentally new materials—precision ceramics and composition and thin-film materials. Of the 10 Eureka projects pertaining to new materials, approximately half are associated with the development of ceramics. There are also projects pertaining to composition and superconducting materials.

Great attention is being paid to transport. The existing projects (about 10) contemplate the rapid development of transport on the scale of all of West Europe and testify to an aspiration to concentrate resources on the solution of central S&T problems of the development of the transport system.

Thus, for example, the Prometheus project with the participation of Great Britain, Italy, France, the FRG and Sweden provides for the creation of a road-transport

system of enhanced efficiency and safety. It is among the most significant of the 62 projects approved at the third intergovernmental conference. Within the framework of the project 13 autonomous firms are developing a control system with sensors and on-board microcomputers to opportunely warn the driver of danger (heavy fog, glaze and so forth). Expenditure thereon in 1986 alone amounted to approximately \$16 million with an annual increase of \$55 million for the next 7 years.

The subject matter of the Eureka projects affords big opportunities, Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Presnyakov believes, for use of the results of the work for military purposes, and it will be difficult for it to maintain a purely civilian focus. At the end of 1985 at a meeting of the Eureka working group experts of the FRG, Britain and Italy stipulated specially that their countries' participation in the program must not impede SDI cooperation with the United States. The directions of the research efforts of Eureka and the SDI coincide in principle. Military purposes in these efforts may be realized in parallel with civilian purposes. Projects for the creation within the Eureka framework of large computers (specifically, the Euromatic project) are directly linked with military aircraft manufacture and the development of new artillery and missile systems. The Euro-robot project provides for the development of laser weapons, which play a key part in the SDI.

Questions of the relationship of the SDI and Eureka and the possible use of the results of the latter in the military sphere were also raised in the speeches of Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye. Talyzina (Moscow State University) and T. Yudina. In T. Yudina's opinion, government circles of some West European states, primarily France, aspire to bind Eureka closely to national military-political plans. In France Eureka is seen as the basis for the acceleration of research in areas of S&T progress which might permit it to remain among the West's leading military powers and preserve the dependability and efficiency of the nuclear potential. In this connection France attaches particular significance to participation in the projects pertaining to the development of new-generation computers, lasers, robotic hardware and new ceramic materials. The hidden military aspects of Eureka are the reason for the negative attitude of France and a number of other states toward the possible realization of projects with the participation of the socialist countries.

At the same time, however, Candidate of Historical Sciences G. Kolosov (IMEMO) and Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Chervyakov (IMEMO) presented arguments in support of the predominantly civilian orientation of Eureka. The transfer of its results to the military sectors could only be indirect and not very significant as a consequence of the specifics of the projects and the criteria imposed on R&D of a military nature. Also insufficiently substantiated, they believe, are certain examples of the relationship of individual Eureka projects and national programs of the creation of weapons systems.

The continuing contradictions between the participants on a number of problems of cooperation reflect specific peculiarities in the approaches to participation in Eureka. Leader-states displaying assertiveness in an extension of the scale of S&T cooperation and states occupying a wait-and-see position have been ascertained. The attention which specialists have paid to the dominating role in the program of the Paris-Bonn-London triangle (see MEMO No 9, 1986, pp 93-100 and No 10, pp 26-40) has pushed into the background, as it were, the countries of "little Europe" and their contribution to realization of the program. This contribution is as yet nonequivalent, as was shown in the speeches of A. Landabaso and Candidate of Historical Sciences K. Voronov in the example of Spain and the Scandinavian countries.

A comparison of the integration processes in the sphere of science and technology in West Europe and within the CEMA framework and an evaluation of the possibilities of the organization of cooperation between EC countries and the socialist countries were made in the speeches of Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Prokudin (USSR Permanent CEMA Delegation), Candidate of Economic Sciences Yu. Andreyev (IMEMO) and S. Fedyukin (IKI).

The Community programs and Eureka on the one hand and the Comprehensive Program of the CEMA Countries' S&T Progress on the other are analogous to a certain extent. This applies particularly to the priority of the main directions of R&D. In terms of organizational structure and methods of realization the CEMA programs have more similar features with the Community programs. However, in terms of the formulation of the tasks and thematic thrust analogies to the CEMA programs may be discovered among large-scale Eureka projects also. This is a prerequisite for a constructive examination of the forms and conditions of cooperation in respect of a particular set of problems within the framework of the two types of international S&T programs.

Among these is research in the field of environmental protection, medicine, agriculture, transport and such. In the search for organizational forms of European S&T cooperation—based on intergovernmental relations or special agreements at nongovernmental level—importance is attached to dialogue with all supporters of a strengthening of S&T relations. Contacts at the microlevel, that is, at the level of research organizations and institutions, industrial firms, enterprises and associations, would seem the most promising. New opportunities for the development of contacts are afforded by the decrees on the creation on USSR territory of joint ventures with the participation of firms of capitalist countries and measures to improve the management of foreign economic relations adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers.

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Colonel Defends Methods of Missile Destruction

PM1210132988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel A. Gutnikov by correspondent Lieutenant V. Polezhayev under the rubric "Implementing the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles": "For Reasons of Simplicity and Economy: Why the Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles Are Being Eliminated in One Particular Way in the USSR Rather Than Another"; date, place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which seemed only recently to be the subject of difficult summit discussions, is now an actual fact. Shorter-range missiles are being destroyed in the region of Saryozek and intermediate-range missiles are meeting the same fate at the Kapustin Yar range. At Chita and Kansk RSD-10 missiles are being eliminated by the launch method, while R-12 missiles are being eliminated by the cutting method. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has published reports from those sites describing each of the procedures. However, as the editorial mailbag shows, there are quite a few readers who doubt whether we have chosen the best methods of missile destruction. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent V. Polezhayev now discusses this matter with Colonel A. Gutnikov, chief of the missile destruction control center.

[Polezhayev] In essence, many readers' questions boil down to one thing: They believe that the U.S. method of missile destruction is environmentally cleaner and more economical than ours. This is the opinion of L. Kaplin from Sochi, for example, and I. Babychuk from Kiev.

[Gutnikov] This is the view of people who do not have all the facts. Do they know, for example, that the body of the RSD-10, like its container, is made not from steel or alloy but ... a specially treated and quite tough fiberglass. So there is no cause for alarm about "hundreds of tons of high-quality metal going up in smoke."

The claim that the "U.S. method of missile elimination is the most environmentally clean and economical" is equally unfounded. After all, both here and in America the solid fuel is completely burned up. Combustion products are formed, of course. Our method does not increase the amount of those products in the slightest. A knowledge of high school physics is sufficient to work that out. Painstaking and repeatedly checked scientific research shows that 1 week of daily explosions in the Saryozek region discharges fewer substances and gases of various kinds into the atmosphere than does a conventional test in a month. Each missile explosion, like the

elimination process as a whole, is most strictly monitored. The monitoring is conducted by physicians, environmentalists, and many other specialists. Therefore, those individuals who talk about the so-called "environmental strain" occurring when missiles are exploded are simply ill-informed.

[Polezhayev] Nevertheless, the Americans chose the burning method. Why?

[Gutnikov] The method whereby missiles are eliminated is determined mainly by their design. Since the mechanical removal of solid fuel from rocket motors is generally precluded by the tremendous complexity and labor intensity of this process, another, more acceptable option has to be chosen. The Americans prefer to burn up the fuel in their Pershings. But we cannot use their experience, as Comrade S. Dorodeykin from Alushta proposes, because the RSD-10's are quite different in design from the Pershings, and their design characteristics make it necessary to use the explosion method. In this instance it is the most economical.

The intermediate-range missiles being eliminated in our country include R-12's, which run on liquid fuel. Their body is made of metal. But no one considered eliminating them by exploding or launching them. It isn't especially difficult to drain liquid fuel from the missile fuel tanks. That is why the R-12's are not eliminated by being blown up.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already described how this is done. The missile, shorn of its nuclear device and its fuel, is transferred to a special shop where all the elements of the guidance system are removed, as happens with all other types of missiles. Not a single instrument, not a single electronic device, not one gram of valuable metal is wasted; everything is used in the national economy. Then a big tractor trailer transports the missile to the shop where the final dismantling takes place. This is where air-plasma and resistance-arc devices are used to cut the metal. The motor nozzles are removed and the fuel tanks and instrument compartments are separated....

As for the means of transporting missiles of all types and the many types of missile equipment, the term "elimination" should not be taken literally at all. Take, for example, the RSD-10 launcher, a first-class transport facility. The erector-launcher is removed and is later cut up. The six-axle trailer itself is left intact, of course, and is used in the national economy. Cranes with a lifting capacity of around 100 metric tons will be fitted on it, and it will be invaluable at large construction sites, particularly in the remote areas of the far north.

[Polezhayev] Does the cleanliness of the elimination of the missiles depend on the missilemen themselves?

[Gutnikov] It does, to a considerable degree. I have visited all the bases where the intermediate-range missiles are being eliminated and have seen this with my own eyes, so to speak.

Take the Lesnaya base: It has spacious shops and the latest machinery. The U.S. inspectors summed the base up in one word: "Magnificent!" But after working there for a month or two, our missilemen produced a succession of reasonable proposals on the improvement of what seemed already to be absolutely perfect equipment. In the less than 6 months spent preparing the base for operations, the soldiers, NCO's, warrant officers, and officers suggested and implemented around 50 reasonable proposals and inventions. The air-plasma cutting device which they improved has aroused interest among many specialists in the national economy.

Some of the missiles, as is well known, are destroyed by the launch method. Does this cause us certain material losses? Of course it does. But what do we get in return?

Invaluable combat experience, and the confidence that each of our missiles is in a state of high combat readiness and perfect technical condition. All the missiles launched at Chita hit the target, as the missilemen say.

The Soviet side's prompt and conscientious implementation of the treaty was also highly praised by U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hritsik, head of the U.S. inspectorate, and James Bush, director of the U.S. defense information center. Many people recalled the question which one of the U.S. inspectors couldn't help asking during the launching at Chita. Observing the skill and cohesion of our crews' operations and the perfect functioning of the missile hardware that was being eliminated, an inspector suddenly exclaimed: "Don't you regret the loss of these missiles?"

What answer could you give him? He himself understood perfectly that the treaty is a path to a nuclear-free world, a path which we are taking together.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Scholz Interview on Security, Disarmament
AU0710140188 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
7 Oct 88 pp 8, 10, 11

[Interview with Defense Minister Rupert Scholz by DIE ZEIT reporters Christoph Bertram and Theo Sommer: "We Take Gorbachev at His Word"—place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [ZEIT] Behind the criticism of Ramstein there is a growing aversion to carrying the burdens involved in sustaining a military presence and military training in the future.

[Scholz] I do indeed believe that the level of awareness of defense needs is decreasing in our population. This is related to two factors.

First, for decades the FRG's population has carried a far greater burden than other countries. For example, for an area equivalent in size, there are 26 times more soldiers stationed on the territory of our country than in the United States, and moreover our country is far more densely populated. And these soldiers are not only present but they have to carry out exercises. This fact alone demonstrates that understanding has to be shown for the population. But as a forward defense, that is, defending our country on the front line, is indispensable for us, we have to put up with more troops and military exercises.

Second, the legitimation of everything concerning military presence and military exercises has been conveyed to the population mainly in terms of perceived threat. If one lives in a period in which the Eastern side is certainly not aiming for war, the awareness of threat automatically dwindles. If I feel endangered, I will regard a low-flying aircraft as protection, but if I do not feel endangered, I will say: What a noise this guy is making again!

[ZEIT] What conclusions do you draw from this?

[Scholz] From my point of view, taking perceived threat as the first guideline for defense needs was and is insufficient. The main thing—and this has not been stated frequently enough in the past decades—is that defense and defense capability are part of a country's independence, sovereignty, self-assertion, and the means of ensuring its self-determination. This constitutes the real and permanent legitimation of the Bundeswehr, that is, of the country's defense in general.

[ZEIT] Can one really use the concept of sovereignty to justify armed forces? So far, the Bundeswehr and defense efforts in the alliance have been accepted as a response to the actual threat. Now you assume a quantity that is in some sense independent of threat as an axiom.

[Scholz] I did not say this.

[ZEIT] But it amounts to this when you talk of the necessity of the Bundeswehr and a strategy that is independent of the extent and seriousness of the threat.

[Scholz] The need for and the organizational form of the Bundeswehr—that is, its size and concrete structure—have above all been justified by aspects of the threat. This can also be explained by postwar history. But for me—this concerns the question of need—in the first place the aspect of political and national defense is decisive. Somebody who does not prove his defense readiness is more easily subject to political blackmail—which can result directly from the real military superiority of the other side.

[ZEIT] But the natural self-assertion and self-respect of a state in a world which is not completely without dangers does not imply that we have to forever maintain 500,000 armed men as a matter of principle.

[Scholz] This is true. I have always tried to differentiate between the questions of necessity and of organizational structure. Necessity is rooted in the concept of the state and is therefore self-evident to a certain degree; for the coexistence of states in general is not without dangers. A second question is the size of the Bundeswehr and the allied forces. The concept of threat has to be taken as a guideline for this question of size.

Here, I come to the point that the Eastern side is still superior, that the other side continues to re-arm, that under Gorbachev nothing has changed. Even if nobody assumes that Gorbachev wants to wage a war, the existing superiority remains unchanged. In assessing the volume of armed forces we have to begin from a dual approach: What is objectively necessary for security and which reductions, if possible, can be made through disarmament negotiations and arms control?

[ZEIT] In this way you resort again to thinking along the lines of threat. You previously spoke of another kind of legitimation.

[Scholz] I have deliberately chosen the word legitimation. It is a constitutional mandate that the FRG takes the steps which are necessary for its security. This goes as far as civic duties such as compulsory military service.

[ZEIT] The question is: How much is enough? For this, threat, and not abstractions of constitutional law, has to be taken as a standard.

[Scholz] The mandate has to be credibly fulfilled. What is credible depends on the situation and the situation becomes concrete in case of threat.

[ZEIT] Many people do not feel the danger, the threat, to the same degree as before—possibly with justification. Isn't this the real problem?

[Scholz] This is indisputable. The perception of danger, which is always connected with a critical situation, has considerably decreased. On the other hand, I do not believe that it is the purpose of the Bundeswehr or the Defense Ministry to conjure up threats in order to prepare for sacrifices, if that is not really called for.

[ZEIT] Is the impression correct that you regard the feeling of many people that the threat has decreased as wrong or at least as premature?

[Scholz] It is premature—I am an optimist and I say “premature,” not “wrong.” It is premature because the real military threat that emanates from the potential of the other side has not been reduced.

[ZEIT] You say that the other side continues to re-arm.

[Scholz] Yes, this can also be proved.

[ZEIT] Is it not evident that both sides continue to make sure that they are not put at a disadvantage, as long as no concrete agreements on disarmament have been made?

[Scholz] I believe that each side not only has the right but, in a certain way, also the duty not to be put at a disadvantage. The Western side, however, is at a disadvantage, above all with regard to conventional armament.

Therefore, “mutual security” is the decisive concept for me. Somebody who has striven for absolute security from the start has to believe in superiority in the final analysis. Somebody, however, who sees that security is interdependent, realizes that security is relative. Relative security always means taking the other side as a guideline.

[ZEIT] For years, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev has bombarded the West with proposals of disarmament and arms control, the majority of which correspond to former Western....

[Scholz] ...demands.

[ZEIT] We react to them by claiming that he should match his actions to his words. Why have we not taken him at his word so far? Why does the West leave the field to Gorbachev?

[Scholz] I do not see at all that it leaves the field to Gorbachev. You were right in another respect: Gorbachev has now accepted the two decisive issues: first, asymmetric disarmament, elimination of disparities, then the only thing for which the East was formerly ready, that is, parallel reduction. He has verbally accepted it. Now the point is to really implement this.

[ZEIT] How can this be achieved?

[Scholz] We will achieve this—hopefully—at the Conference on Conventional Disarmament (KRK Conference). It seems that the mandate will soon be adopted in Vienna—and, by the way, this is on the basis of Western proposals. Therefore, we are going to take Gorbachev at his word.

[ZEIT] Before you assumed office, the following idea had always been valid in Bonn: Before the West can embark on serious talks about disarmament at all, it has to develop an overall concept. Is an overall concept politically relevant whatsoever? Or is it a flight into noncommittalism?

[Scholz] It is neither a flight into noncommittalism, nor must it be one. The call for an overall concept is justified by having assured oneself how one will view the relationship between armament measures which are required in the long run, and the arms control and disarmament steps to which one must aspire. In this respect, in many ways the overall concept has to be viewed as a process.

[ZEIT] Such an overall concept will mainly be determined by the input of the Federal Government. What is our input? How do we define our interests? How many nuclear weapons do we need?

[Scholz] Of course, the German input is defined by our national security needs. The following question, above all, is related to this: How will forward defense continue to be efficient and credible? We cannot renounce forward defense. Regarding the question of nuclear weapons, I believe that denuclearization cannot be considered by us.

[ZEIT] By the FRG or by Western Europe?

[Scholz] By the FRG and Western Europe.

[ZEIT] Would you regard it as denuclearization if the British and French still possessed nuclear weapons, but no more U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed in the FRG?

[Scholz] I do not consider this possible under the given circumstances.

[ZEIT] Not desirable or not possible?

[Scholz] Neither possible nor desirable. The most important aspect is that the Western alliance is also a community of risks. And the continued effectiveness of the United States' nuclear commitment in Europe forms part of a community of responsibilities and risks in an alliance which bases West European security mainly and necessarily on the U.S. presence and U.S. commitment.

[ZEIT] Do you already draw conclusions from this with regard to modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons in the FRG?

[Scholz] Modernization is a concept which basically constitutes something that is a matter of course.

[ZEIT] But not only are the old systems being modernized—there are also plans to buy new systems.

[Scholz] Of course, modernization also implies new systems. But I do not believe that the concrete question of modernizing short-range systems is really an open question in our country today. There is actually no immediate need to make a decision.

[ZEIT] But you consider a certain minimum of nuclear weapons to be indispensable?

[Scholz] Deterrence must be credible. Nuclear weapons are primarily political weapons, political weapons that make war impossible because the risk to the attacker is too great. In this respect, I definitely see possibilities of restrictions in the sector of nuclear artillery, which is closely related to conventional warfare and, thus, to the possibility of waging wars. Accordingly, for me short-range systems have a different value than nuclear artillery.

[ZEIT] Approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons are stored in the FRG. The range of two-thirds of them is below 25 km. These weapons can only kill Germans—put precisely, only West Germans—and allied soldiers on German territory.

[Scholz] It depends on where they are positioned.

[ZEIT] If you consider modernizing the Lance missile system or replacing it by a more modern system—do you connect this with the idea of drastically reducing the remaining arsenal? And can you specify a limit? How much is enough?

[Scholz] I do not think that it is possible to specify the number of nuclear warheads. This number also depends on what we define as a convincing deterrent. I think that the basic philosophy—as stipulated by the NATO Council of Ministers in Montebello in Canada—is correct: Quality must be given priority over quantity. I consider it useful to reduce the quantity of nuclear weapons if the quality of deterrence is not impaired.

[ZEIT] What do you think about a unilateral reduction of the existing nuclear weapons in the NATO sphere in Europe?

[Scholz] The NATO alliance has already unilaterally withdrawn 2,400 nuclear warheads. I am in favor of reducing nuclear warheads on both sides.

[ZEIT] Do you consider it possible that a drastic reduction of battlefield weapons on the Western side could be coupled with a drastic reduction of Eastern tank forces in the GDR by way of a compensation deal?

[Scholz] Actually, it is not the task of the KRK Conference to negotiate nuclear weapons. The superiority concerning tanks on the other side will certainly be a central topic of this conference. However, weapons systems that can fire both conventional and nuclear ammunition can also be a topic for discussion.

The basic question for me in this context is: How will the KRK Conference proceed? Will tanks be compared with tanks, artillery with artillery, armored personnel carriers with armored personnel carriers, and the strength of troops with the strength of troops? Or will the conference focus on what I call compatibility, which means that the impact and significance of weapons are also included, that the question is raised: How do they correspond to each other in terms of their strategic effect?

[ZEIT] According to the principle: You withdraw the weapons we are most afraid of, and we will withdraw the weapons you are most afraid of?

[Scholz] “To be afraid of something” will certainly not be the decisive aspect. A more objective system of evaluation must be worked out. It is a question of the criteria that are used to assess things. In our view, this includes the term “invasion capability,” which certainly exists in the Warsaw Pact.

[ZEIT] Would you abandon the option to extend the range of the Lance system in exchange for a drastic, visible, and convincing reduction in the invasion capability of the other side?

[Scholz] The elimination of the invasion capability is the decisive goal for us.

[ZEIT] This could also be paid in nuclear currency?

[Scholz] I cannot judge and answer this today.

[ZEIT] But you do not exclude it?

[Scholz] Nothing can be excluded.

[ZEIT] Mr Minister, 4 weeks ago you stated at the staff college in Blankensee that, in view of the geostrategic conditions in the FRG, we need a certain strength in the Armed Forces. Is there a limit below which we should not go in disarmament negotiations? What are the relevant criteria?

[Scholz] It is not possible to specify an exact number.

[ZEIT] “Strength” is usually indicated in numbers.

[Scholz] “Strength” is always determined on the basis of the requirements. If I have to defend a few hundred kilometers, a certain minimum is required. But this cannot be defined in abstract terms in advance, because it depends on the extent of the threat that is posed by the other side.

[ZEIT] You also said in Blankensee that a significant reduction in the forces that are stationed in the FRG is not compatible with the current military-strategic requirements. Given this, does it make any sense at all to start negotiations?

[Scholz] This assessment was solely based on the status quo. However, if a sizable reduction is carried out on the other side, the significance will of course change.

[ZEIT] The FRG and the Western allies want to suggest to the Soviets that, during an initial phase of disarmament, the latter reduce their arsenals to 95 percent of the current strength of NATO forces. This would affect several types of weapons that are of particular importance for the invasion capability, such as tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, and possibly aircraft. That means that the West would expect the Warsaw Pact to scrap some 30,000 tanks, whereas NATO would have to eliminate only 1,500 units. This may be a logical concept, but is it a realistic basis for negotiations?

[Scholz] This is the primary goal of negotiations. Reducing disparities, however, does not constitute too great a demand for the Soviets, because it is with regard to tanks in particular that they have such an enormous superiority.

In this context, I would like to take up the three-phase model of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, which basically points in the right direction: First, disparities must be eliminated. This includes the exchange of data and the verification of data. As a further step, reductions should be carried out on both sides to an equal extent. This is a constructive basis, I think. In the course of further parallel reductions, the target of 95 percent is not dogma for me.

[ZEIT] Foreign experts do not think that the FRG will once again take the risk of modernizing nuclear weapons, as it did in the case of the Pershing II and cruise missiles. Is this also true for the politician Scholz? Or would you be willing to deploy new U.S. nuclear weapons on FRG soil, and would you be ready to fight for it?

[Scholz] If the need arises, of course I will.

[ZEIT] Even if political acceptance is lacking?

[Scholz] There is the military and the political aspect, and the political aspect includes the problem of acceptance. Ultimately, decisions are made on the political level, but first the military-strategic question concerning the necessity must be clarified and answered.

[ZEIT] Can we trust the demands of military officials? Heiner Geissler has accused the Air Force leadership of leading the politicians down the garden path. As a matter of fact, for years it claimed that it is not possible to reduce the number of low-altitude flights, saying that otherwise defense obligations could not be fulfilled.

However, if a crisis emerges or if a new defense minister is appointed, it suddenly becomes possible. Why do the politicians not turn the tables and say: "The number of nuclear weapons is X or Y, construct a convincing deterrent out of this?"

[Scholz] The military does not exist in a sphere that is not affected by politics. The political mandate must be given absolute priority, which is undisputed among the Bundeswehr. The military has a task to fulfill, and must provide expert analyses. The military must define what is necessary in military-strategic terms from its point of view. The politicians must assume responsibility for the decision that is taken on the basis of military-strategic analyses that have been submitted to them.

[ZEIT] Does this not mean that you deprive yourself of the possibility to shape politics?

[Scholz] Military experts start from a specific real situation. This means that currently they have to base their deliberations on the military superiority of the Warsaw Pact and have to find an answer to it. The politicians can expect them to do that. The politicians then decide what is actually to be done.

[ZEIT] Is it conceivable for the politician Scholz to tell his generals: "I would like you to prepare calculations on how we can manage with 1,000 nuclear weapons on FRG soil and what the other side would have to do in terms of disarmament?" It is not good for politicians to always base their decisions on worst-case analyses!

[Scholz] The preliminary political decision cannot be made in a void. But the military experts must also make plans and calculations as to what they need when the extent of the threat is reduced to a certain level.

[ZEIT] The grand strategy, disarmament, and Gorbachev's initiatives are important issues. The actual challenge for Defense Minister Scholz, however, lies elsewhere. Within a short period, you will no longer be able to maintain the effective strength of the Bundeswehr. You will not be able to pay the expenses that will accrue up to the year 2000. How will the Bundeswehr make ends meet?

[Scholz] The military planners have their requirements. It remains to be seen whether the results will correspond to what you have described now in mere speculations.

[ZEIT] The demographic curve will not change significantly in the future.

[Scholz] This is not the main problem. Plans must be worked out that bring about a high degree of mobility and provide a concept for reservists that should compensate for the shortage.

[ZEIT] Do you think that you will get the additional DM40 billion which according to Army calculations, would be required up to the year 2000?

[Scholz] You are mentioning horrendous sums that were once established through a misunderstanding and were then passed on and misinterpreted.

[ZEIT] What are realistic figures?

[Scholz] I cannot tell you today how much the "Army Structure 2000" will actually cost. But as far as can be assessed today, it will be possible to finance it out of the current budget and the means that have been provided by the medium-term financial planning.

[ZEIT] The actual number of those liable for military service will drop by 50 percent over the next few years. How can you maintain the current strength of the Bundeswehr in view of this development?

[Scholz] Young people do quite a lot during the 18 months of military service. In addition to that, we must increasingly use reservists. The potential of reservists has been used very selectively by the Bundeswehr during the past years. This will change.

[ZEIT] Will the the German taxpayer be able to afford this?

[Scholz] Yes, I think he will.

[ZEIT] According to plans drafted by your ministry, 400,000 reservists must annually be called up for the envisaged 15,000 training places. Since usually one-third are unfit for military service or are not called up for other reasons, 600,000 reservists would have to be called up every year.

[Scholz] These are not the figures on which I currently base my deliberations.

[ZEIT] These are the figures that have been mentioned in your ministry.

[Scholz] Lots of figures are being quoted.

[ZEIT] What are your figures?

[Scholz] I do not want to specify figures at the moment. It is my task to ensure defense in terms of security and resources.

[ZEIT] Is it not true that it is vital for the FRG that results be achieved quickly during the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms control?

[Scholz] This is not our basis for talks at the KRK Conference. For a number of reasons, I am interested in successful disarmament negotiations. To come to terms with our own difficulties, however, is not the primary reason.

[ZEIT] You have not said anything about how you want to maintain the strength of the Bundeswehr up to the middle of the nineties.

[Scholz] The reason why I have not made any specific statement is that I have not finished my deliberations, my plans, in this field. I have commissioned a number of plans which also deal with making service in the Bundeswehr, which will face much stiffer competition from the economy in the future, more attractive.

[ZEIT] Why do you not establish another government commission on the structure of the Bundeswehr in order to have the problems reexamined under the changed conditions, thus creating a suprapartisan basis for the necessary decisions of the nineties?

[Scholz] I do not rule out such a thing. But first I need to have all kinds of surveys.

[ZEIT] You recently stated that progress in the political reconciliation of interests between East and West is a precondition for disarmament. Did you want to make the one conditional on the other? If so, how? First reunification, then disarmament; first an improvement of the human rights situation and then disarmament?

[Scholz] Disarmament alone does not lead to detente. Political disarmament, however, is not possible without the reconciliation of interests, it requires more dialogue, more cooperation. Disarmament does not automatically bring about detente. Disarmament is one element of the policy of detente, but not more.

[ZEIT] More dialogue, more cooperation. The GDR minister of national defense has indirectly invited you to start talks. Have you meanwhile received a personal invitation from Mr Kessler?

[Scholz] No, I have not. But I think that the main emphasis must now be placed on the KRK conference—and the possibilities that exist in connection with conventional disarmament. The GDR must be as much interested in this as we are. I consider possible bilateral contacts useful in this context.

[ZEIT] In connection with the KRK Conference....

[Scholz] The important joint concern must now be this conference.

[ZEIT] ...do you think contacts at the defense minister level will be possible and useful?

[Scholz] I think this depends on the situation.

[ZEIT] Do you consider it possible for you to receive Mr Kessler at your ministry and inspect one of your divisions with him in Sigmaringen—or for you to visit Mr Kessler and observe an artillery exercise in Lehnitz?

[Scholz] I consider many things possible. But for me the main thing is usefulness.

[ZEIT] Can one tell in advance whether such a meeting will be useful?

[Scholz] We should now jointly concentrate on the KRK Conference. In this respect, what is conducive will certainly be done.

[ZEIT] As soon as the mandate for Vienna is fixed and negotiations have started, do you think that bilateral German-German talks will be possible and useful?

[Scholz] The overall goal is a multilateral solution. The states from both alliances must conduct negotiations in this respect. I rule out special agreements, including German and intra-German agreements. I am sure Mr Kessler will share my view. What the two German sides can do in addition to promoting this overall multilateral process really depends on developments. If something can be achieved jointly, I will certainly participate.

FRANCE

Mitterrand Calls for Ban on Chemical Weapons

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[Text] Paris, Sept 26 (AFP)—France is going to “take the necessary initiatives” for the total banning of chemical weapons, a statement from the office of President Francois Mitterrand said Monday.

The statement from the Elysee Palace, which said “everything must be done to completely prohibit chemical weapons”, came as U.S. President Ronald Reagan called for a conference to negotiate a “global ban” on such weapons.

It did not spell out what French measures were envisaged, but Mr. Mitterrand is expected to talk of the danger of chemical weapons proliferation when he addresses the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Thursday.

The statement said France was trustee of the 1925 Geneva protocol “prohibiting the use in war of toxic asphyxiating gases and bacteriological means” and that “as such, it considers it has particular responsibilities”.

France, it went on, was also “one of the most active participants” at the ongoing Geneva conference on disarmament, which is working for the creation of a convention prohibiting the manufacture of any chemical weapon.

The French statement coincided with the proposal from President Reagan, which he made to the UN General Assembly on Monday. Other speakers are also expected to raise the matter at the General Assembly.

Use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq, and Iraq's reported recent deployment of them against its Kurdish minority, have highlighted their role in the Third World as the “poor man's nuclear bomb”.

At the same time their relatively easy acquisition—some 20 countries are believed to possess them, according to specialist sources—underlines the problem in outlawing them.

Only the utilisation of chemical weapons is outlawed by the Geneva Convention of 1925. As the French presidential statement said, multilateral negotiations continue in Geneva for a ban on their manufacture. Expert sources here say the basic problem in the Geneva negotiations is that of control and verification of an agreement, for which no satisfactory technical means exist at present.

The French have also stressed the problem of a proposed 10-year transition period, by the end of which chemical weapons will have been eliminated, if a treaty is signed. They proposed in 1987 that signatories be allowed to stock, or even acquire, limited quantities of such weapons during the transition period. The stated aim of this stance—to which the Soviet Union is opposed and to which the other Western Allies have also not agreed—was to prevent Moscow holding a monopoly during the transition.

Some informed sources believe the French could abandon their idea of “minimum security stocks”, or at least the possibility of acquiring stocks after signing of a treaty, and that this constitutes the initiative announced.

While experts generally agree that France possesses chemical weapons, the authorities have neither confirmed nor denied it.

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